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This thesis focuses on di⁄erent aspects of Competition Policy and analyses questions
related to market power, collusion and the European Commission￿ s ￿ning policy. The ￿rst
chapter provides a theoretical setting to study a particular abuse of dominant position, known
as margin (or price) squeeze. It explores the conditions under which margin squeeze arises as
an equilibrium outcome and discusses policy implications of introducing price squeeze testing.
In the ￿eld of cartel detection, the leniency program has been instrumental in competition
authorities￿￿ght against cartels. This is the topic of the second paper, which examines the
deterrence e⁄ect of the leniency program in a setup where all cartels are failing cartels. The
third chapter provides an overview of the ￿ning decisions of the European Commission in
the ￿eld of antitrust. It analyses the incentives of ￿rms to appeal Commission infringement
decisions and examines whether the ￿ning Guidelines have led to lower appeal rates, possibly
through providing greater transparency in the way ￿nes are set.





This thesis consists of three papers on competition economics. In this introduction I will
describe the motivation and the main results of each of the papers.
The ￿rst paper focuses on the exclusionary practice of price squeeze. Following the
liberalization of national network monopolies, potential entrants need to acquire access at
the incumbent￿ s network in order to serve consumers in the downstream market. Entrants
often complain to antitrust authorities that the price margin between the access price they
pay to the incumbents to get access at the network and the downstream price is not su¢ cient
to cover the downstream costs (see cases Telefonica, Wanadoo, Deutsche Telekom). The
European Commission has argued that such a pricing strategy constitutes an exclusionary
practice. However, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear ex ante whether the
incumbent ￿rms would have an incentive to engage in such a practice (one monopoly pro￿t
argument).
The paper explores the conditions under which margin squeeze can arise by analysing
a two stage game between a vertically integrated ￿rm and a downstream competitor. Fore-
closure incentives can arise as an equilibrium outcome since the vertically integrated ￿rm
su⁄ers from a time inconsistency problem: it cannot commit to not undercut its rival ￿rm
once it has granted access to its network. Therefore, in anticipation of strong downstream
competition the incumbent ￿rm might prefer to exclude altogether or raise the costs of its
competitor. I show that the incentives of the incumbent depend on the type of competition
(including the degree of di⁄erentiation of the downstream products), on the relative down-
stream costs of the two ￿rms, on the relative importance of the upstream costs and on the
size of the demand. Also the relative merits of price squeeze testing are assessed compared
to other remedies such as structural remedies and regulation.
The second chapter studies the deterrent e⁄ect of leniency programs. Much of the recent
success of antitrust authorities in detecting and prosecuting cartels has been attributed to the
introduction of leniency programs. However, some critics claim that leniency programs would
only capture failing cartels. This raises concerns since leniency applications could suck up
antitrust authorities￿resources without necessarily enhancing deterrence. More speci￿cally,
there would be no procompetitive e⁄ect from such applications since these cartels would fail
in any case. At the same time deterrence may be reduced since the leniency policy inherently
lowers the ￿ne for the ￿rm that reports the illegal activity.
In this chapter, I present a model of imperfect information where only ￿rms partici-
pating in failing cartels would apply for leniency. In this setting, leniency applications are




triggered when the cartel participants realize that the cartel activity would collapse in the
following period. Contrary to the critics, I show that leniency programs can actually en-
hance deterrence by placing ￿rms into a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma situation which dominates any
reduction in the ￿nes. Leniency programs would be anticompetitive only for very signi￿cant
detection rates. However at such high rates collusion would not be sustainable in the ￿rst
place. Therefore, the introduction of the leniency program is never anticompetitive in the
framework of failing cartels.
The third paper provides an extensive analysis of the European Commission ￿ning de-
cisions in the ￿eld of antitrust. Fines are a fundamental pillar of punishing infringements of
antitrust rules. However, there has been an increasing unease in the European Competition
Policy with the high proportion of cases that are appealed. There has been criticism that a
major factor behind these appeals has been the obfuscation surrounding how the Commis-
sion decides on the level of the imposed ￿nes. In 1998 the European Commission published
Guidelines on the calculation of ￿nes to enhance transparency and these were complimented
by a new set of Guidelines in 2006. However, a signi￿cant number of ￿rms still resort to
litigation.
In the paper I perform an econometric analysis of the probability of appealing Commis-
sion decisions. The role of the Guidelines appears signi￿cant. Following the 2006 Guidelines
￿rms that have been ￿ned are less likely to appeal Commission decisions after controlling
for other relevant variables. Also following the 1998 Guidelines the European Courts have
awarded lower reductions in the ￿nes set in the Commission decision.
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DO INCUMBENT FIRMS HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO PRICE
SQUEEZE?
1.1 Introduction
Article 102 of the Treaty on the European Union and Sherman Act Section 2 prohibit re-
spectively the "abuse of dominant position" and "monopolisation, attempts and conspiracies
to monopolise". The strategy of price (or margin) squeeze is one of the several foreclosure
strategies such as tying, bundling, predation or refusal to deal, that dominant1 ￿rms may
employ in order to exclude rival ￿rms. Price squeeze arises when a vertically integrated
dominant ￿rm, that in the extreme case could be an upstream monopolist, uses its control
over an input of the production of the downstream good in such a way that does not allow
an e¢ cient rival ￿rm(s) to make a pro￿t in the downstream market, where the integrated
￿rm also operates.
The question that arises is whether, and under what conditions, price squeeze constitutes
a pro￿table strategy for the vertically integrated ￿rm. According to Geradin and O￿ Donoghue
(2005), price squeeze may arise if the essential input represents an essential facility2 with no
cheap bypass been available. Furthermore, they argue that it should constitute a relatively
high, ￿xed portion of the downstream costs. These arguments appear plausible, however, a
theoretical framework seems also necessary.
The price squeeze test has raised a lot of controversy in light of recent high pro￿le
decisions on both sides of the Atlantic on whether it should be considered a separate antitrust
infringement (see Carlton (2008) and Sidak (2008)). Several critics of price squeeze testing
argue that other legal tests such as refusal to deal, predation and excessive pricing are
su¢ cient to address foreclosure concerns. They argue that if upstream and downstream
prices are independently compatible with antitrust rules then a price squeeze test would
only protect potential entrants.
1Dominance is de￿ned in the Commission Guidance Paper (2008) as "a position of economic strength
enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent e⁄ective competition being maintained on a relevant
market, by a⁄ording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its
customers and ultimately of consumers".
2Essential facility is a facility that is prohibitive to duplicate and access to it is indispensable for entry
in the downstream market.
1
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, to provide an analytical framework to analyse
under which circumstances (if any) price squeeze can constitute a rational business strategy
for the vertically integrated ￿rm. We examine how the level of competition in the downstream
market may a⁄ect such incentives, by considering di⁄erent forms of competition at the
downstream level. Second, we consider whether introducing price squeeze testing improves
social welfare and whether other antitrust infringements address price squeeze concerns.
In the ￿rst part of the paper (section 2) we introduce the general setup of the market
under consideration, we discuss the alternative versions of the price squeeze test and we
provide a short overview of price squeeze cases in EC law and in the US. The second part
analyses the incentives of the ￿rms to price squeeze. The starting point of the analysis
is the contrasting views of the Chicago school - arguing that price squeezing, and more
generally foreclosure strategies, cannot constitute a rational business plan- and more recent
Industrial Organisation models that provide theoretical settings where foreclosure strategies
are viable (section 3). We show that total foreclosure may arise when ￿rms compete strongly
in the downstream market (section 4) while only partial foreclosure may arise under quantity
competition (section 5). Section 6 extends the analysis to di⁄erentiated products; section 7
concludes.
1.2 Market structure and test format
1.2.1 The general framework: notation and market structure
In our framework there are two levels of production, the upstream and the downstream
market. The incumbent ￿rm, denoted as I, is a vertically integrated ￿rm that is an upstream
monopoly, i.e. it holds an essential facility in the upstream market, but also operates in the
downstream market. In the downstream market there is also a potential entrant, ￿rm E. In
order to operate in the downstream market ￿rm E needs to gain access to ￿rm I￿ s essential
facility. Firm I charges a per unit access price, A, to ￿rm E to grant such an access. Therefore,
￿rm E is at the same time a customer and a competitor of the vertically integrated ￿rm.
A simple example of this setup is the telecommunication sector. The vertically integrated
￿rm is a national incumbent such as Telecom Italia or Deutsche Telekom that operates the
network but also supplies broadband and other telecom services to ￿nal consumers. The
potential entrant is a ￿rm such as Tele2 that, without (necessarily) establishing its own
network, supplies services to consumers.3
3The general framework is relatively broad and can be applied to any market where there is an upstream
monopolist controlling an essential facility (e.g. network industries, manufacturing)
Magos, Dimitrios (2011), Three Essays in Competition Policy 
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The cost structure is as follows: Firm I has an operating marginal cost, V , in the
upstream market while the costs in the downstream market are denoted Ci and Ce for the
vertically integrated ￿rm and the entrant respectively. Firm E is assumed throughout to
be more e¢ cient than ￿rm I, i.e. Ce < Ci. We also assume that there are no ￿xed costs.
Furthermore, there is a ￿xed proportions technology i.e. one unit of good produced in the
downstream market requires one unit of the upstream input, and there are no interoperability
costs. The ￿nal prices for end users are denoted Pi and Pe or simply P when the good is
homogeneous. The demand is given by
P = Z ￿ q
where 4
Z > max(Ce + A;V + Ci) (1.1)
1.2.2 The appropriate test format
Price squeeze arises when an ￿ equally or reasonably e¢ cient service provider￿cannot
obtain a normal pro￿t in the downstream market. The ￿rst question that arises is which
￿rm, the dominant ￿rm￿ s own downstream operation or the potential entrant, is expected
to obtain a normal pro￿t downstream. The two alternative formats therefore are:
Equally e¢ cient competitor test : P ￿ A ￿ Ci (1.2)
Reasonably e¢ cient competitor test : P ￿ A ￿ Ce (1.3)
In our setup Ci > Ce and therefore the ￿rst version is more di¢ cult to ￿ pass￿for the
incumbent. The former version of the test also corresponds to the e¢ cient component pricing
rule (ECPR). This rule suggests that the optimal access price should be equal to the sum of
the direct cost and the opportunity cost of the vertically integrated ￿rm to grant access to
its rival, namely in our setup
A = V + (P ￿ (V + Ci)) = P ￿ Ci
On the other hand, the reasonably e¢ cient competitor test might be preferable from a
welfare perspective given that the rival E is more e¢ cient than I. Otherwise, an unnecessarily
4Condition (1.1) is required to guarantee that there would be su¢ cient demand for the product when
either the incumbent or the potential entrant operates in the market.
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too high price ￿ oor would be imposed to ￿nal consumers. In this spirit, Brunekreeft et al
(2005) suggest that a test of the form
P ￿ A + min(Ci;Ce)
should be performed. Also, under both the equally and the reasonably e¢ cient competitor
test, ine¢ cient entry (Ce > Ci) is discouraged.
Further issues on the appropriate test format are provided in Appendix 1.9.1.
1.2.3 Price squeeze in the US and EC law
In the US, there has been a vivid discussion on whether price squeeze should constitute a
separate antitrust violation. Price squeeze was recognised as an antitrust liability in Alcoa5 in
1945. This judgment was based on concepts of fair pricing and living pro￿t which, according
to several commentators, are hard to reconcile with today￿ s antitrust focus on consumer
welfare.6 In 2004, the Trinko7 judgment warned against the use of antitrust rules to impose
duties to deal on dominant ￿rms. The judgment suggests that if a dominant ￿rm is not
subject to a duty to deal it is not obliged to guarantee a minimum level of assistance in the
provision of services to rivals. This logic would preclude price squeeze claims when there
is no duty to deal. Following a series of con￿ icting cases, the Supreme Court reinstated
Trinko￿ s logic in LinkLine stating that "if there is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and
no predatory pricing at the retail level, then a ￿rm is certainly not required to price both of
these services in a manner that preserves its rivals￿pro￿t margins".8
In EC competition law there have been a few formal price squeeze decisions where the
Commission and the European Courts appear to suggest that price squeeze may constitute a
"clear-cut abuse". The ￿rst case is the National Carbonising (1975) 9 where the price squeeze
was detected based on the costs of a reasonably e¢ cient manufacturer in the downstream
market. In Napier Brown/British sugar case (1988)10 the European Court of Justice (EcJ)
found that there has been an antitrust violation based on the equally e¢ cient competitor
test, claiming that the margin was insu¢ cient to "re￿ ect the dominant company￿ s own costs
of transformation". The Court of First Instance (CFI) judgment on the case of Industries
des Poudres Shperiques (IPS)11 in 2000 rea¢ rmed that price squeeze would be detected when
5United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
6See for example Faella and Pardolesi (2009)
7Verizon Communications Inc., Petitioner v. Law O¢ ces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, (2004)
8Paci￿c Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications. Inc. [2009] USSC, Case No. 07￿ 512 [Paci￿c
Bell Telephone v. Linkline Communications]
9Commission Decision 29 October 1975, OJ 1976 L35/6.
10Commission Decision 18 July 1988 88/518/EEC, OJ 1988 L2 84/41.
11Case T-5/97 Industrie des Poudres Shperiques SA vs Commission (2000) ECR II-3755
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an equally e¢ cient competitor could not compete. Deutsche Telekom (DT)12 was ￿ned in
2003 for charging more its competitors for unbundled broadband access than the ￿nal retail
price it was charging the consumers, i.e. P ￿ A < 0.13 DT was condemned even though the
access price had been subject to ex ante approval by the German regulator, regTP.14 In the
2008 appeal judgment of the DT case, the CFI con￿rmed that price squeeze is a separate
infringement of article 82 EC (now 102 TEU), even if the access price is regulated. In 2007,
it was Telefonica￿ s turn to be condemned by the European Commission for the Spanish
market of broadband services.15 Finally, the Guidance paper on article 82 EC (now 102
TEU) explicitly mentions price squeeze among the priorities of the Commission enforcement
and price squeeze abuse is grouped together with refusal to deal.
A thorough review of price squeeze cases by Geradin and O￿ Donoghue (2005) suggests
that in the EU, price squeeze cases are more frequent at the national level, in the decisional
practice of regulatory and competition authorities as well as national courts. They conclude
that in late years such cases of price squeeze, especially in the telecommunication sector, have
multiplied transforming the question of price squeeze from an "obscure issue that belonged
to the realms of academic discussion, .. into an .. intensely debated practical issue in the
area of telecommunications".16
1.3 Foreclosure incentives and the Chicago school
In this part we review the arguments regarding the incentives of a vertically integrated
￿rm that is a monopolist upstream to resort to foreclosure strategies. The underlying idea of
the Chicago school suggests that the vertically integrated ￿rm has no incentive to foreclose,
simply because it is not a rational business plan; it could make more pro￿ts by allowing the
(more e¢ cient) rival ￿rm to enter because there is "one monopoly pro￿t" to be captured.
On the other hand, the foreclosure doctrine suggests that the vertically integrated ￿rm may
have an incentive to foreclose entry either to extend upstream market power or to protect
its upstream monopoly.17 In our setting foreclosure will arise due to the inability of the
vertically integrated ￿rm to solve its commitment problem.
12Commission Decision 21 May 2003 OJ 2003 L 236/9.
13In this case the Commission suggested that the relevant version of the test is the equally e¢ cient
competitor test.
14This contrasts with the the US case law in Trinko where it is suggested that once an industry is regulated
then it is exempted in some sense from antitrust concerns.
15Commission Decision 4 July 2007 Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo Espaæa/Telef￿nica
16Geradin, D., O￿ Donoghue, R. (2005) p2.
17Several theories that incorporate imperfect information have been developed to explain foreclosure in-
centives. For an analysis of di⁄erent theories on foreclosure strategies see Motta (2004) chapter 7.
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1.3.1 Chicago School (no commitment problem)
The Chicago school proponents (ex Bork (1978)) argue that a test for price squeeze is
super￿ uous even when the access price can be set freely by the vertically integrated ￿rm.18
The idea is that ￿rm I would have no incentive to foreclose e¢ cient entry since an upstream
monopolist can reap all the bene￿ts from the entry of a more e¢ cient entrant downstream.
Firm I has e⁄ectively two choices. One is to foreclose which can be achieved by setting
a price at the monopoly level
P =
Z + V + Ci
2
(1.4)
and charging a high access price, A, where P ￿ A < Ce.
Alternatively, it can choose an access price at the monopoly level but ensuring that
P ￿ A ￿ Ce and the rival ￿rm could enter. Assuming that the downstream competitor has
no market power19 then downstream prices are set at marginal cost and P = Ce + A; with
the entrant(s) serving the whole downstream market. Firm I could set the access price to
extract all the pro￿ts of the entrant(s) with
P =
Z + V + Ce
2
(1.5)
Therefore, a monopoly price arises but now ￿rm I "outsources" its downstream produc-
tion to a more e¢ cient ￿rm, ￿rm E. If, as assumed, ￿rm I is less e¢ cient than ￿rm E and
given that pro￿ts are a decreasing function of costs, ￿rm I would prefer to grant access. This
example demonstrates that ￿rm I will choose to foreclose only when it is more e¢ cient than
its rival, raising no productive e¢ ciency concerns. Therefore, the entrant serves the market
while ￿rm I reaps all the pro￿ts.20
Proponents of the Chicago school would suggest that if a price squeeze case is detected
it could well be for entirely legitimate reasons. For example, low downstream prices could
be set as a temporary marketing device for the introduction of new goods or because of the
sale of a complementary product.
18When the access charge is regulated, ￿rm I does not possess A as an instrument to reap the pro￿ts of the
entrant. Firm I would then be able to foreclose only through low downstream prices, i.e. predate. However,
the Chicago school proponents would suggest that a ￿rm would have no incentive to predate since this is
simply ine¢ cient destroying industry pro￿ts. For a thorough discussion see Motta (2004), chapter 7.
19For example because there are many such potential entrants.
20The original Chicago school example considers an upstream monopolist and perfectly competitive down-
stream ￿rms that are not related with the upstream ￿rm. The argument is that the bottleneck owner would
not have an incentive to vertically integrate to extend its monopoly power to the downstream segment; it
can simply exercise its monopoly power on the bottleneck- there is a single source of monopoly pro￿t. On
the other hand "imperfect" competition in the downstream market could create distortions that could create
such incentives to vertically integrate (double marginalisation).
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1.3.2 Foreclosure incentives
More recent economic theory suggests that an upstream monopolist faces a commitment
problem that may not allow it to extract all the monopoly pro￿t (Hart and Tirole (1990)).
An upstream monopolist facing several downstream buyers may not be able to commit to
restrict sales at the monopoly level. The pro￿t maximising strategy, as discussed above,
would be to set the input price at the monopoly level. However, once it agrees this with the
￿rst buyer, the upstream monopolist would have an incentive to sell to the second buyer.
Anticipating this strategy of the monopolist the ￿rst buyer would not accept an access price
set at the monopoly level since it would risk making its business loss making. As a result
the commitment problem of the monopolist limits its ability to exploit its monopoly power
(similar to durable goods monopolist). Hart and Tirole (1990) suggest that through vertical
mergers a monopolist acquires a direct stake on the downstream pro￿ts which will allow it
to credibly commit not to o⁄er secret price cuts to rivals (restoring monopoly power).
The question that arises is whether, for example following such a merger, a vertically
integrated ￿rm that is an upstream monopolist still has an incentive to discriminate against
the potential entrant. In the extreme case it might refuse to grant access to its input
altogether, or it might want to employ other foreclosure strategies such as price squeeze.
In this paper we demonstrate that a vertically integrated ￿rm might not be able to
fully restore its monopoly power through vertical integration since the mere existence of its
downstream operations limits its ability to set monopoly access pricing. As a result, ￿rm I
might bene￿t from excluding a customer (￿rm E) when the extra pro￿ts it can get in the
downstream market because of the greater market power it would enjoy are signi￿cant. More
speci￿cally it would have an incentive to foreclose if the reduction in demand for its upstream
input is o⁄set by additional sales downstream. The incentive therefore would depend on the
relative pro￿tability of the upstream and the downstream market. The higher the upstream
margin relative to downstream pro￿ts the greater the disincentive to engage in price squeeze.
We also demonstrate that the degree of product di⁄erentiation is an important parameter to
this respect. When the products are perfectly di⁄erentiated the incumbent ￿rm would have
no incentive to foreclose the entry of ￿rm E. The downstream ￿rms will be serving di⁄erent
markets and by excluding ￿rm E, ￿rm I would simply lose its customer.
The nature of the commitment problem that ￿rm I faces can be illustrated in the Chicago
School example given above. As long as ￿rm I cannot credibly commit not to compete in
the downstream market once it has granted access to its input, the Chicago School outcome
suggested above is not subgame perfect. In other words, monopoly access pricing is not
incentive compatible when ￿rm I can in￿ uence the price in the downstream market. The
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monopoly price might be higher than the own costs of the incumbent ￿rm as long as
P
m =
Z + V + Ce
2
> (V + Ci) , Z ￿ V ￿ Ci > Ci ￿ Ce (1.6)
The entrant will anticipate that once he pays the access price to the dominant ￿rm,
￿rm I could undercut him and serve all the downstream market, making extra pro￿ts but at
the same time obliging ￿rm E to make negative pro￿ts. Firm E, anticipating this behavior,
would not accept such an access price in the ￿rst place. Therefore even if the monopoly
pro￿ts under the Chicago school scenario are strictly higher for ￿rm I than in the foreclosure
case, ￿rm I faces an incentive problem which as we demonstrate in sections 4-6 may lead to
foreclosure.21
Therefore, the very nature of vertical integration could create incentives to discriminate
against the potential entrant. On the other hand, the vertically integrated ￿rm may still
prefer to exploit the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E and not (totally) foreclose. From a social
welfare perspective vertical integration provides some advantages, notably a positive e⁄ect on
double marginalisation, however, ￿rm E is less likely to produce which leads to productive
ine¢ ciency. Hence, these two e⁄ects would have to be balanced out.22 In what follows,
we analyse how the aforementionted e⁄ects intertwine and how the type of competition
downstream a⁄ects the incentives of the vertically integrated ￿rm to foreclose. Furthermore,
in this setup the e⁄ects of introducing a price squeeze test are assessed and contrasted with
other antitrust infringements, notably predation, and other potential remedies.
Other related literature include Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990). In a setting of
upstream competition (i.e. no monopolist upstream) they show that vertical integration
might bene￿t the downstream division of the integrated ￿rm by reducing competition in the
upstream market. This might increase the market power of the remaining upstream oligopoly
￿rms leading these ￿rms to raise prices to the downstream competitors. This e⁄ectively raises
rival￿ s costs, also referred to as partial foreclosure.23 However, this hinges on the ability of
the integrated ￿rm to commit not to serve downstream competitors. Another rationale for
foreclosure in the downstream market is to deter entry in the upstream market (Carlton and
Waldman (2002)).
21Indeed an analysis (similar to the Bertrand case) reveals that foreclosure will arise when
Z ￿ V ￿ Ci < 4(Ci ￿ Ce) when there is perfect competition in the downstream market.
22Other potential advantages of vertical integration include reduction of transaction costs, economies of
scope, better provision of services. These beyond the scope of this paper. For more on vertical integration
see Motta (2004), chapter 6.
23As opposed to total foreclosure when entrants are deterred from entering.
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1.4 Price (Bertrand) Competition
1.4.1 Price Competition analysis
We ￿rst consider the case where the ￿rms compete in prices ￿ la Bertrand in the down-
stream market.
The timing of the game is as follows:
In stage 1, ￿rm I decides what price to charge to ￿rm E for granting access to its essential
facility.
In stage 2, ￿rms I and E compete in prices in the downstream market.
Given the timing of the game ￿rm I does not have the market power to determine
the price in the downstream market as it cannot commit that it will not intervene in the
downstream market if it can produce cheaper than ￿rm E i.e. ￿rm I faces the incentive
problem explained above.
Proposition 1.1 Under downstream Bertrand competition, ￿rm I will prefer to foreclosure
when Z ￿ V > 5Ci ￿ 4Ce
Proof: We solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
In the second stage, price competition in the downstream market implies that the more
competitive ￿rm serves the market while the other one remains inactive. When there are
small cost asymmetries (case Ai), price equals the costs (upstream and downstream) of the
less competitive ￿rm. The winner of the market needs only to undercut slightly the rival up
to the point that the latter cannot produce pro￿tably anymore.24 When there are large cost
asymmetries, ￿rm E is able to set monopoly pricing.
The total costs of production for the two ￿rms are V +Ci and A+Ce respectively. Since
the access price is a choice variable in the ￿rst stage we need to distinguish two broad cases
of entry (Ai and Aii) and foreclosure (B).
Case Ai: Entry Bertrand pricing. When V +Ci > A+Ce ￿rm E serves the market.
When V + Ci < Z+A+Ce
2 , then the small cost asymmetries Bertrand outcome arises and
P = V + Ci (1.7)
24When the cost asymmetries between the ￿rms are relatively small then any pair of prices where the
least e¢ cient ￿rm charges a price between its own marginal costs and the marginal costs of the most e¢ cient
￿rm and where the most e¢ cient just undercuts this price constitutes a Nash equilibrium. At the same time,
simple selection criteria, such as Pareto dominance or elimination of weakly dominant strategy, select the
Nash equilibrium where the least e¢ cient ￿rm charges its marginal cost and the most e¢ cient ￿rm slightly
undercuts it. In the limit we shall assume that the least e¢ cient ￿rm charges the marginal cost of the
relatively ine¢ cient ￿rm.
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In this case, the downstream price is "completely" determined in the second stage (since
it is not a function of A) and the pro￿t of the vertically integrated ￿rm and of the entrant
are given respectively by25:
￿
B;E
I = (A ￿ V )(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.8)
￿
B;E
E = (V + Ci ￿ A ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.9)
Hence, the total pro￿ts to be split among the two ￿rms are
￿
B;E
Total = (Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.10)
that represents the productive e¢ ciency that is brought in the market by the entrant
￿rm.
Case Aii: Entry Monopoly pricing. When there are large cost asymmetries V +Ci >
Z+A+Ce
2 ; ￿rm E charges the monopoly price
P
B;M =
Z + A + Ce
2
(1.11)
since it is lower than the marginal cost of the incumbent. Hence the incumbent cannot
pro￿tably undercut this level of pricing. Firm I￿ s pro￿ts are
￿
B;M
I = (A ￿ V )(
Z ￿ A ￿ Ce
2
) (1.12)
Case B: Foreclosure. When V + Ci < A + Ce, ￿rm I serves the market and sets
P = A + Ce (1.13)
The pro￿t of ￿rm I in the downstream market is given by
￿
B;F
I = (A + Ce ￿ V ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ A ￿ Ce) (1.14)
while the entrant makes no pro￿ts. Therefore given that A is chosen by ￿rm I in stage
1 this case amounts to ￿rm I being a monopolist.
In the ￿rst stage, ￿rm I can either choose A to allow entry or set A at prohibitively
high level, e⁄ectively foreclosing the downstream market.
25Subscripts denote the ￿rm (I or E) while the superscript denote the type of competition, Bertrand (B)
or Cournot (C) and whether there is Entry Bertrand pricing (E), Entry Monopoly pricing (M) or Foreclosure
(F).
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s:t: V + Ci ￿ A + Ce (entry condition) and
V + Ci <
Z + A + Ce
2
(small cost asymmetries)
Since pro￿ts are an increasing function of the access price the entry condition should
bind, namely
A
B;E = V + Ci ￿ Ce (1.15)
Note that this is the maximum access price that allows the entrant to serve the market




I = (Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.16)
￿
B;E
E = 0 (1.17)
Hence, ￿rm I can appropriate all the pro￿t that is brought in the market by the higher
e¢ ciency of ￿rm E.26




s:t:V + Ci ￿ A + Ce (entry condition) and
s:t:V + Ci >
Z + A + Ce
2
(large cost asymmetries) (1.18)
The optimal access and downstream price as well as ￿rm pro￿ts are given by
A
B;M =
Z ￿ Ce + V
2
(1.19)
26Given our setup ￿rm I has all the bargaining power concerning the distribution of the pro￿ts brought in
the industry. This assumption makes foreclosure less likely. Imagine that ￿rm I would have a zero pro￿t in
an entry scenario then of course it would prefer foreclosure.
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P
B;M =












(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
16
(1.22)
This case can arise only when (1.18) holds i.e. substituting (1.19)
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) <
1
3
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.23)




I = (A + Ce ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Z ￿ A ￿ Ce) (1.24)
s.t. A > Ci + V ￿ Ce (no entry condition) (1.25)









Z + V + Ci
2
￿ Ce (1.27)




(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)2
4
(1.28)
Foreclosure may arise The vertically integrated ￿rm will choose A depending on which case
yields the highest pro￿ts for it; that is whether the productive e¢ ciency gains compensate
￿rm I for the loss in its monopoly pro￿ts. Therefore ￿rm I will foreclose when ￿rm I￿ s pro￿ts
in the foreclosure scenario exceed its pro￿ts in entry, (1:28) > (1:16) or
Z ￿ V > 5Ci ￿ 4Ce (1.29)
27Note that (1.27) satis￿es the condition for no entry, given (1:1)
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This proves Proposition 1.1.28
Inequality (1.29) is more likely to arise, and hence foreclosure may arise, when the cost
di⁄erence between the ￿rms is small and when the upstream costs are relatively small. When
demand is relatively high (Z is high relative to the cost parameters) the incumbent would
prefer to serve the market itself since the pro￿t margin it can make is relatively signi￿cant.
Interestingly, entry may be foreclosed even when the entrant has low costs relative to the
incumbent as long as Z (the demand) is very high.
Also, if the entrant is relatively e¢ cient compared to the incumbent the latter will prefer
to exploit the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E rather than foreclose entry. On the other hand,
when the cost di⁄erence is small, ￿rm I prefers to monopolise the downstream market. Also
as seen from (1.16), in the entry scenario the pro￿t margin that ￿rm I enjoys depends on
the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E compared to ￿rm I. The smaller the cost di⁄erence is the
lower the access price that ￿rm I is able to credibly set (since ￿rm I will be able to undercut
￿rm E for a greater range of parameters) and therefore the lower the pro￿ts for ￿rm I.29 As
a result, when the cost di⁄erence is relatively small ￿rm I prefers to foreclose entry and act
as a vertically integrated monopolist. In other words, it is not pro￿table for ￿rm I to extract
the productive e¢ ciency of the entrant rather than enjoy the monopoly pro￿ts of its own
(albeit less e¢ cient) downstream operations.
Welfare analysis In the welfare analysis we only consider the Entry Bertrand pricing and
Foreclosure cases since the comparison of these two conditions determines the choice of ￿rm
I to foreclose entry or not.
Lemma 1.1 Under foreclosure social welfare is lower compared to the entry scenario.
In the (Bertrand pricing) entry case the downstream price as well as the pro￿ts of the
￿rms do not depend on the access charge, A. The social surplus, W, is given by the sum of
the incumbent pro￿ts (equation (1:16)) and the consumer surplus, S.
S
B;E =







(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)
2 + (Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.31)
28Note that under Entry ￿rm I can always receive at least (1.16) and in the parameter range (1.18) it
receives the max ((1.16),(1.21)).
29The incumbent might prefer to set an even higher access price (at monopoly level), however at that level
￿rm E would anticipate that ￿rm I cannot credibly commit not to compete with ￿rm E in the downstream
market.
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In the foreclosure case the monopoly price is charged, namely P F =
(Z+V +Ci)
2 . The social
surplus is exactly at the level it would be when a monopoly with costs V +Ci sells the ￿nal
good. Consumer surplus and (combined with (1:28)) total welfare are
S
B;F =





3(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)2
8
(1.33)
with (1:33) < (1:31).
Comparing equations (1:30) and (1:33), we observe that the social welfare under foreclo-
sure is lower than the consumer surplus alone under (Bertrand pricing).30
In a nutshell, W F < SE < W E. The ￿rst inequality re￿ ects the allocative ine¢ ciency
from monopolization whereas the second one re￿ ects the productive ine¢ ciency when ￿rm I
is producing in the foreclosure case.
We can depict the social welfare analysis in the diagram below. In the foreclosure case
the incumbent makes pro￿ts equal to B whereas the total welfare is A + B. In the entry
case the pro￿ts of ￿rm I (and total pro￿ts) is represented by area F +G. Consumer surplus
is area A + B + C. When B > F + G ￿rm I has an incentive to price squeeze. Note that
from a social welfare point of view this is undesirable since there is a net bene￿t of the areas




















30Therefore, if consumers could coordinate among themselves they could compensate the incumbent to
allow entry.
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Furthermore, the socially optimal outcome is not achieved under neither scenarios.31
When there is perfect competition both upstream and downstream, prices simply equal
marginal cost and the Social Surplus is simply the consumer surplus
W
C =
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
2
(1.34)
Nature of the Price Squeeze We have analysed the optimal strategies of the vertically
integrated ￿rm and showed that ￿rm I behaves anti-competitively (since by Lemma 1.2
social welfare is lower under foreclosure than under Bertrand pricing Entry) if inequality
(1:29) is satis￿ed. It can employ the instrument that it processes, namely the setting of A,
to foreclose entry even if from a socially point of view this is not bene￿cial.
The question that arises is whether existing competition policy tests can deal with this
strategy of the incumbent or there is a need for a tailor made test. Interestingly, one realizes
that predation charges cannot be sustained. The price charged by ￿rm I is higher than its
total costs since ￿rm I makes positive pro￿ts. On the other hand, if the downstream branch
of the integrated ￿rm was to operate separately then it would be making losses. The access
price is determined by the pricing condition, A = P ￿Ce, and therefore the total costs of the
disintegrated (hypothetical) downstream operator are P +Ci￿Ce. The downstream pro￿t
per unit is Ce ￿ Ci which is negative given that ￿rm E is relatively more e¢ cient.32 It may
be argued that excessive pricing charges could be put forward, given the monopoly nature
of (1.27). However, excessive pricing is very seldom used in the current antitrust practice
and as a result it appears that there is room for price squeeze testing.
1.4.2 Remedies
This section of the paper analyses several possible remedies and their e⁄ects on social
welfare. In what follows we shall concentrate on the case where there is foreclosure, that is
the anticompetitive scenario.
31Welfare under (Bertrand pricing) entry is lower than under perfect competition (see Appendix 1.9.2).
In the (Bertrand pricing) entry case, ￿rm I enjoys market power which is illustrated from the fact that the
access price is higher than the upstream costs. As a result the price set is higher than the social welfare
maximising level.
32Note that technically, an equally e¢ cient competitor test is not satis￿ed under Entry Bertrand pricing;
however such a test would not be pursued by competition authorities since ￿rm I is not active in the
downstream market (in any case the e⁄ects of price squeeze testing also under Entry Bertrand pricing are
examined in Appendix 1.9.4).
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1.4.2.1 Structural remedy
The divestment of the vertically integrated ￿rm is one natural candidate for addressing
the price squeeze identi￿ed above. However, as shown below, this does not improve the
outcome for the consumers.
Lemma 1.2 Under downstream Bertrand competition, imposing structural separation does
not bene￿t consumers, however, social welfare may improve due to productive e¢ ciency.
Proof: Under this remedy, both the divested downstream branch of I, denoted I￿ , and E
have to pay ￿rm I an access price, A. In the ￿rst stage, ￿rm I sets an access price A to both
I￿and E. At stage 2, downstream ￿rms compete in price.
Under the assumption that Ce < Ci in the second stage of the game, only ￿rm E stays
active33 and the price that it charges in this divestment scenario, denoted as P d, is
P
d = A + Ci (1.35)
This price, given the nature of the Bertrand competition in the downstream market,
re￿ ects the costs of the less e¢ cient downstream competitor.
In the ￿rst stage of the game ￿rm I sets the access charge, A, to maximise its pro￿ts,
given equation (1:35). This yields
A
d =
Z + V ￿ Ci
2
(1.36)
The access charge is lower than under foreclosure, given in (1:15):34 Substituting into
equation (1:35) the downstream price is identical to the foreclosure case (equation (1:26))
P
d =
Z + V + Ci
2
(1.37)
The structural remedy is still a monopoly pro￿t maximization problem. Firm I￿ s pro￿t
is identical to the foreclosure case (equation (1:28)). Furthermore, since the price and the
quantity consumed remain unchanged the consumers are not better o⁄ (i.e. Sd = SB;F).





(Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)
2
(1.38)
33We consider the small cost asymmetries case since as shown in Appendix 1.9.4 for the relevant value
parameters it is not pro￿table for the upstream monopolist to set A such that ￿rms downstream have "large
cost asymmetries" so that ￿rm E can set a monopolist price.
34For the range of parameters for which condition (1.29) holds.
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B;F + (Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < W
B;E (1.39)
The second inequality arises because of the higher price in the divestment case (caus-
ing greater allocative ine¢ ciency).35 The ￿rst inequality re￿ ects the productive e¢ ciency
achieved in the divestment case. In terms of the graph above consumers enjoy area A, ￿rm
I has pro￿ts equal to area B and the entrant gets area F.
Therefore while the productive ine¢ ciency of the foreclosure case disappears, the double
marginalisation (monopoly upstream and Bertrand margin downstream) does not allow the
￿nal price to drop. In Appendix 1.9.4 price discrimination and non linear pricing are pre-
sented in the context of structural separation as ways to solve the double marginalisation
problem.
1.4.2.2 Regulation
An alternative option for the regulator is to impose an appropriate access price to guar-
antee that E actually enters. Essentially the ￿rst stage of the game is not played since the
regulator now chooses A. For example, the regulator could impose
A = V or any A 2 [V;V + Ci ￿ Ce]
This would allow E to enter and serve the downstream market. Therefore, when the
access price is appropriately regulated then ￿rm I has no scope to foreclose entry. The
downstream price is equal to P = V + Ci, given that for this range of A the entrant has
lower total costs than the incumbent. Consumer surplus is equal to the level achieved in the
entry case, SE. The choice for A is an instrument to share the total pro￿t. When A = V then
all the pro￿ts are appropriated by the entrant while when A = V +Ci￿Ce all pro￿ts accrue
to the incumbent, as in the entry scenario. In terms of the graph above, consumer surplus
is equal to A+B +C whereas the pro￿ts to be shared is represented by area F +G. Under
regulatory access pricing the social welfare is identical to the entry scenario. Consumers
gain from lower price (which is now determined upstream from regulation and downstream
35Note that this inequality also illustrates that the structural separation outcome may be welfare detri-
mental when entry is the optimal outcome of the game in section 4.1. This arises since the downstream
price under structural separation is higher. For a complete analysis of the structural divestment scenario see
Appendix 1.9.4.
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from Bertrand competition) and productive e¢ ciency is achieved given that ￿rm E serves
the market.
However, a regulatory intervention in terms of setting the access price may be problem-
atic. For example, as Chone (2002) argues that it is very hard in practice to evaluate the
access price appropriately as it is necessary for the regulatory authority to be able to calcu-
late the upstream costs, V . He claims that this is harder to determine than the downstream
costs of the two ￿rms. The informational disadvantage for the regulator is greater given that
in the downstream market there are two competitors, and therefore an additional source of
information. Also, in V infrastructure costs are included which are hard to estimate in a
multi-product environment. Instead it could be easier to estimate the incremental costs in
the downstream market. Furthermore, regulation raises an expropriation issue and it a⁄ects
the ex ante incentives of ￿rms to invest (see for example Motta (2004)).
1.4.2.3 Price Squeeze tests
An alternative remedy is to impose a price squeeze test. Given the inconclusive discussion
on the appropriate test format (see section 2.2) we generally assume a price squeeze format
P ￿ A+￿ with ￿ being the minimum margin between the two prices chosen by the regulator
or the competition authorities, i.e. ￿ 2 [Ce;Ci].
Lemma 1.3 Under Bertrand downstream competition, price squeeze testing improves con-
sumer and social welfare. It also achieves a weakly superior outcome compared to structural
separation.
This test limits the strategy space for ￿rm I. In the second stage of the game ￿rm I has
"costs" not necessarily equal to V + Ci but the maximum between (A + ￿;V + Ci).
Since ￿ is higher than Ce, ￿rm E serves the market at price36
P = A + ￿ (1.40)
This happens since the "costs" of ￿rm E are lower than those of the incumbent ￿rm,
namely A + Ce < A + ￿:
In this entry scenario, ￿rm I maximizes its pro￿t
maxA(A ￿ V )(Z ￿ A ￿ ￿)
36It can be shown that it is not pro￿table to set A such that A+￿ is smaller than V +Ci when condition
(1.29) holds. An analysis for all parameter range is exposed in Appendix 1.9.5 for ￿ = Ci:
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Z + V + ￿
2
(1.42)
It is straightforward to show that this price is obtained when a ￿rm enjoys a monopoly
position with underlying costs V + ￿.
Concerning the e⁄ect of this policy to social welfare one should note that the social
welfare is decreasing in delta. More speci￿cally,
W
ps =
(Z ￿ V ￿ ￿)2
4
+
(￿ ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ ￿)
2
+






When ￿ = Ci, then the outcome is exactly the same as when the vertically integrated
￿rm is divested. This means that there is a productivity gain, which accrues to the entrant,
but there is no gain for consumers. As ￿ decreases the double marginalisation problem also
decreases since ￿rm E has lower market power.
When ￿ = Ce the entrant is making no pro￿t. The price charged in the downstream
market is identical to the price charged by a monopolist with underlying costs V +Ce. The
social welfare is identical to the welfare in the case of a monopoly with costs V +Ce, namely
W
ps=ce =
3(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)
8
(1.44)
Since Ce < Ci the pro￿t margin "allowed" for ￿rm E is lower which results in lower
￿nal price and therefore more output is produced than under divestment (with linear pricing
and no price discrimination). The price squeeze obligation makes ￿rm I￿ s high access price
credible. Therefore even if ￿rm I￿ s cost are lower than E￿ s, the price squeeze test does
not allow ￿rm I to undercut ￿rm E. Under this scenario we do not achieve the high social
welfare results obtained under price regulation. It can be shown that that W ￿=Ce < W E
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Practical implications concerning the price squeeze test Chone (2002) argues that the price
squeeze test o⁄ers some further advantages. Its greatest advantage is on the practical side;
namely, that calculating costs in the downstream market may be easier than the upstream
costs of ￿rm I. Also there is no need to calculate the internal prices charged by the integrated
￿rm.
To abide with the price squeeze test, the incumbent ￿rm would have either to decrease
the access price, A or to increase the downstream price it charges, or both. Chone (2002)
argues that pricing according to the price squeeze test is sometimes better suited than
blind cost orientation since sometimes depriving the monopolist from reaping the bene￿ts
of their investment can have negative consequences in the long run, reducing the ability
and incentives to innovate. Therefore policy makers shall also take into account how the
monopoly position has been acquired as Motta and de Streel (2003) suggest.37 The price
squeeze test instead would let the monopolist receive its monopoly pro￿t and at the same
time the welfare outcome similar to a divestment would be at least achieved.
The above analysis only holds for the case where (total) foreclosure arises in section 4.1.
Imposing a price squeeze test for the range of cost parameters for which only ￿rm E serves
the market would impose a too high price ￿ oor on the market (see Brunekreeft et all (2005)).
An analysis of introducing an equally e¢ cient test also for the price of the entrant leads to
higher prices as illustrated in Appendix 1.9.5. However, it is highly unrealistic that antitrust
authorities would require such a price squeeze obligation when the vertically integrated ￿rm
is not active downstream.
1.4.2.4 Nonlinear pricing
In this part we consider the implications of relaxing the assumption on the linearity of
the access price. Suppose ￿rm I charges ￿rm E a franchise fee of the form R + wq, where
w = V , i.e. the marginal cost of the upstream production, and R is the ￿xed part or the
franchise fee. In this case the maximization problem of ￿rm E yields
P
nl =
Z + V + Ce
2
(1.45)
which is the same price as with a monopolist with downstream costs Ce. The pro￿ts of
the entrant are
37For example if the upstream market is the only pro￿table level of production (because for example
downstream competition is very strong) setting an upper limit to the access price might discourage investment
in the only pro￿table level of production.
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(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
4
￿ R (1.46)
If ￿rm I has all the bargaining power then he can charge R to appropriate all the pro￿ts.
Such pro￿ts for ￿rm I are strictly higher than under foreclosure. However, ￿rm I cannot
commit that it will not undercut ￿rm E in the downstream market in the second stage of
the game. It has an incentive to sell in the downstream market since its marginal costs are
V + Ci which is below (1:45). Therefore if the incumbent cannot credibly commit the two
part tari⁄ does not solve the problem. The equilibrium price would remain V + Ci (see
Appendix 1.9.4 for the impact of non linear pricing in the structural remedy scenario).
1.4.2.5 Merger
An integrated structure whereby ￿rm I and E are brought together yields strictly greater
pro￿ts to ￿rm I than the foreclosure scenario (note that ￿rm E makes no pro￿t in either
scenario). Chicago school proponents may argue that ￿rm I would prefer to merge with the
rival rather than to ine¢ ciently engage in price squeeze or other foreclosure strategies. In
our setting we could assume that before the game described above begins, i.e. at stage 0,
￿rm I can make a take it or leave it o⁄er to the entrant to buy its technology. Indeed, given
that we consider the case where ￿rm I has an incentive to behave anti-competitively, ￿rm I










(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)2
4
Given that the entrant is making zero pro￿ts (under both the entry and the foreclosure
scenario), ￿rm E would be willing to sell its technology even for a sellout price as low as
zero. Furthermore, such a merger has positive e⁄ects for the society since consumer surplus
is also increased, under inequality (1:29). This arise since the integrated structure would not
have a commitment problem, would internalise double marginalisation and at the same time
would exploit the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E.
On the other hand, social welfare does not always increase compared to the Entry
Bertrand case (Bi) above; this arises since under Bi a much lower price is set which is
likely to compensate for the lower pro￿ts of the ￿rms (see Appendix 1.9.3). Furthermore, in
a dynamic context such a zero sellout price merger scenario could have very adverse e⁄ects
since if the entrants know that they will bought o⁄for nothing they would simply not invest
in more productive technologies.
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1.5 Quantity (Cournot) Competition
1.5.1 Quantity Competition Analysis
In this section we assume that the ￿rms compete downstream in quantities and we
explore whether they have similar incentives as in the Bertrand case.
The timing of the game is identical: in the ￿rst stage ￿rm I chooses the access price and
in the second stage the ￿rms compete in quantities.
The second stage is a Cournot game with asymmetric costs; ￿rm I faces costs V + Ci
and ￿rm E A + Ce. Solving the game backwards, the second stage "standard" Cournot















Z + V + Ci + A + Ce
3
(1.49)
The equilibrium quantities suggest that there is a range of values of A that i) both
￿rms can operate in the downstream market ii) ￿rm I operates as a monopolist or iii) ￿rm
E operates as a monopolist. Therefore, a priori we have to compare three scenarios under
which small cost asymmetries arise. When ￿rm E operates as a monopolist we need to
further consider a small and a large cost asymmetries scenario.
In the ￿rst stage of the game ￿rm I maximizes its pro￿t, which is given by the following
Kuhn Tucker optimisation problem
maxA￿
C
I = (A ￿ V )qE + (P ￿ V ￿ Ci)qI
s.t. qI ￿ 0;qE ￿ 0
Case A: Duopoly. When both constraints are not binding, which implies that both
￿rms produce positive quantities, the optimal A and P (substituting equation (1:50) in
(1:49)) are given by38
A
C;D =
5Z + 5V ￿ Ci ￿ 4Ce
10
(1.50)
38The superscript stands for Cournot (C), Duopoly (D).
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P
C;D =


































(Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.54)
Case Bi: Only Entry Cournot pricing. When the constraint on qi binds, i.e. when
￿rm I produces a quantity equal to zero, through equation (1:47); the optimal A is
A
C;E = 2V + 2Ci ￿ Z ￿ Ce (1.55)
P
C;E = V + Ci (1.56)
The pro￿ts of the ￿rms are given:
￿
C;E
I = (V + Ci ￿ Z + Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.57)
￿
C;E
E = (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.58)
￿
C;E
Total = (Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.59)
Note interestingly that these are the total pro￿ts also under Bertrand competition with
entry (equation (1:16)). Similarly the price, consumer and social welfare are identical to the
entry scenario under Bertrand (see equations (1:30)-(1:31)).
Case Bii: Only Entry monopoly pricing.





I = (A ￿ V )(
Z ￿ A ￿ Ce
2
)
s.t. V + Ci >
Z + A + Ce
2
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This leads to the same outcome under Entry monopoly pricing under Bertrand (equations
(1.19)￿ (1.20)) and it is optimal when:
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) <
1
3
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.60)
Case C: Foreclosure. When the constraint on qe binds then equation (1:48) determines
the access price and the market outcome coincides with the foreclosure case of the Bertrand
game (equations (1:26)- (1:28))




(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)2
4
(1.61)
These results provide interesting insights.
Proposition 1.2 Under downstream Cournot competition i) ￿rm E is never optimally to-
tally foreclosed from the market ii) both ￿rms are active in the downstream market when
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce)
Proof:












(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)2
4
Hence, total foreclosure cannot arise as a pro￿t maximizing outcome. Firm I receives,
when both ￿rms compete, pro￿ts which are strictly greater than when ￿rm I produces as a
monopolist. This implies that ￿rm I will never have the incentive to totally foreclose entry
under Cournot, as long as the new entrant is strictly more e¢ cient than ￿rm I. This proves
part i) of the Proposition












I = (V + Ci ￿ Z + Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)
() (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) >
2
5
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.62)
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39which also proves part ii) of the Proposition. This implies that both ￿rms would
produce as long as demand is relatively large, upstream costs are relatively small or the
downstream cost di⁄erence between the two ￿rms is relatively small.
Conversely, only ￿rm E will be active in the downstream market when
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿
2
5
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.63)
Welfare analysis Again here we compare only the cases which determine whether duopoly
or only entry will take place (i.e. Case A and Bi). Comparing the optimal, from ￿rm I￿ s
perspective, price in the duopoly and only entry Cournot pricing scenarios (Cases A and
Bi) we observe that the duopoly price, (1:51); is higher when duopoly is maximising ￿rm I￿ s
pro￿ts and lower when the entrant is the only ￿rm operating downstream, i.e. the highest
price is always set.40 Similarly, when inequality (1:62) holds welfare is higher when only ￿rm
E is active downstream even though duopoly arises as an equilibrium outcome while when
￿rm E is the only producer (i.e. inequality (1:62) does not hold), social welfare is higher
under duopoly. Therefore, ￿rm I￿ s choice leads to lower social welfare than the other case
would lead to (see Appendix 1.9.7). This arises because the adverse e⁄ect on pricing (and
as a result on consumer welfare) dominates the increase in ￿rm I￿ s pro￿ts.
Nature of price squeeze As shown in Proposition 1.2, under Cournot competition total
foreclosure does not arise. Therefore, the reasonably e¢ cient competitor test, P ￿ A ￿ Ce;
is never violated, in other words such a price test would be super￿ uous. However, a price
squeeze arises when the equally e¢ cient competitor test is applied in the case of duopoly.41
This means that if the incumbent￿ s downstream a¢ liate were to face the same access price
as the entrant faces it would make losses. This leads to partial foreclosure (raising rival￿ s
costs).
The most obvious scenario for price squeeze allegations is case A where both ￿rms are
active downstream but the price structure of the access price and the downstream price are
such that gives rise to P ￿ A ￿ Ci. Therefore,
Lemma 1.4 Under downstream Cournot competition, partial foreclosure arises
39Note that this condition bears some similarities with equation (16) of the Bertrand competition analysis.
40See Appendix 1.9.7
41Also an equally competitor test is not passed under Bi as under Bertrand competition. However, such
a price squeeze test where ￿rm I is not active in the downstream market is not enforced in current antitrust
practice.
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1.5.2 Comparison with Bertrand competition
Comparing the results of the Bertrand and the Cournot game, we observe two main
di⁄erences. First, total foreclosure never arises under Cournot while it may arise under
Bertrand when the cost di⁄erence between the two ￿rms downstream is not very signi￿cant
(see Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 and diagram below). Secondly, for a greater range of parameters
it is likely that ￿rm E is the only downstream player under Bertrand competition. Firm E
is the only active ￿rm under Cournot when inequality (1:62) holds. Comparing this with
inequality (1:29), we observe that it is a more stringent condition and therefore less likely
to arise (i.e. in the coloured area below under Cournot both ￿rms are active while under
Bertrand only ￿rm E). The intuition behind both observations relates to the nature of
Cournot competition.
The second observation arises because ￿rm E under Cournot enjoys greater market power
than under Bertrand. This is re￿ ected from the fact that ￿rm I can only capture part of
the total pro￿ts in the "only entry" case under Cournot while in Bertrand ￿rm I extracts all
pro￿ts through the access price. As seen by equations (1:16) and (1:57) the pro￿ts of ￿rm I
are lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand for relatively large cost di⁄erences
(which implies that only ￿rm E operates). However, one notes that the combined pro￿ts of
the two ￿rms are identical under Cournot and Bertrand competition (equations (1:10) and
(1:59)). Furthermore, the ￿nal price when only ￿rm E operates (and there is Bertrand or
Cournot pricing) is the same under both types of competition; however, the access price is
set at a lower level under Cournot competition (by comparing equations (1:15) and (1:55)).
These elements re￿ ect the market power of ￿rm E under Cournot when there are relatively
large cost di⁄erences which leads to a di⁄erent pro￿t sharing among the ￿rms. As a result
of its lower pro￿ts under Cournot, ￿rm I would prefer to produce downstream for a greater
parameter range under Cournot than under Bertrand. Furthermore, under Cournot, Entry
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monopoly pricing is more likely to arise (indeed it always arises when
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) <
1
3
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.64)
since under Bertrand ￿rm I enjoys higher pro￿ts when there are small cost asymmetries (and
therefore Entry Bertrand pricing). This is welfare detrimental.
The observation on the foreclosure incentives of the incumbent can be explained in terms
of the di⁄erent magnitudes of the e⁄ect of the reduction of demand for the upstream input,
and the extra volumes that the incumbent can sell downstream. In Bertrand when ￿rm I
forecloses the market, it serves the whole market whereas when it allows entry its downstream
operations remain inactive. At the same time since there is Bertrand competition the pro￿ts
to be made by the rival ￿rm downstream would be expected to be relatively small in the
scenario where the ￿rms￿costs do not vary signi￿cantly, since it can only gain the di⁄erence
between these costs.42 This reduces the scope to extract revenues from the access price, A;
and therefore the incentive to foreclose is much stronger.
The interesting part of the Cournot case is that there is an intermediate step where
both ￿rms could serve the market. The incumbent by reducing the price slightly below
the monopoly (foreclosure) level, and loosing a mere
(Ci￿Ce)
5 on the inframarginal units,43
can get access to a larger market through ￿rm E. More speci￿cally it could gain
2(Ci￿Ce)
5
units that can be produced by ￿rm E yielding pro￿ts per unit (A ￿ V ) and would only
have to give up
(Ci￿Ce)
5 units of its own production. Computing the value of these units
for ￿rm I, one observes that the value of the extra units produced by ￿rm E is larger than
the value that ￿rm I could contribute on its own. The intuition is that the incumbent is
able to exploit the productive e¢ ciency of the entrant without having to sacri￿ce much of
its own quantity produced. This can be also seen from the evolution of access prices when
cost di⁄erences are relatively small (compare equations ((1:15)) and (1:50)). As the two
￿rms become closer in terms of their cost structure (Ci decreases), ￿rm I can increase the
access price under Cournot duopoly while under Bertrand competition the access price would
have to be reduced to ensure that ￿rm E can operate e⁄ectively. Furthermore, the access
price that ￿rm I can set in a Cournot duopoly is higher than the price that ￿rm I can set
when only ￿rm E serves the market under Bertrand competition (comparing (1:15) with
(1:50)). A higher access price under Bertrand would not be credible given the strength of
downstream competition; in other words ￿rm E would not accept a higher price since ￿rm I
42On the other hand, the pro￿ts under the entry case can be higher than in the foreclosure case since the
form of Bertrand competition obliges ￿rm E to produce a very large quantity relative to the monopoly level
produced by the incumbent in the foreclosure scenario and/or because the entrant is very e¢ cient relative
to the incumbent, i.e when (Ci ￿ Ce) is very large.
43Re￿ ecting the change in price in both cases (see equations (45) and (13))
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cannot commit not to compete in the downstream market once it has granted access to ￿rm
E. However, since downstream competition is weaker under Cournot competition, ￿rm I is
able to set a higher access price and thereby exploit ￿rm E￿ s productive e¢ ciency.
This result bears strong similarities with the commitment problem described by Hart and
Tirole (1990). An important insight is that the upstream ￿rm faces a commitment problem;
the loss of monopoly power associated with the commitment problem is more severe the more
competitive the downstream segment is. In our setting having the downstream operations
the integrated ￿rm cannot bene￿t from the greater e¢ ciency of the entrant unless it sets an
access price that ensures the viability of its business when competing with the downstream
operations of the vertically integrated ￿rm. Under downstream Bertrand competition with
small cost asymmetries therefore there is a stronger incentive to foreclose since ￿rm E would
only enter when the access price is relatively low (strong commitment problem). On the
other hand in Cournot a relatively higher access price can be set given that competition is
weaker (no big commitment problem) and therefore it is not optimal for the incumbent ￿rm
to exclude an e¢ cient competitor.
1.5.3 Cournot with n ￿rms downstream
We extend the above Cournot model by introducing n ￿rms in the downstream market
that compete with the downstream a¢ liate of the vertically integrated ￿rm. We assume that
all the potential entrants, E1, ..., En have the same marginal cost, Ce.
Total foreclosure does not arise in a generalised game with n downstream ￿rms competing
in quantity. Firm I, as in the duopoly case above always prefers these ￿rms to enter. As
long as a condition on costs holds, namely that
Z ￿ V ￿ Ci ￿
2n
n + 4
(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.65)
￿rm I also produces in the downstream market alongside these ￿rms. When the sign of
the inequality is reversed then ￿rm I prefers to let only the entrants to supply the down-
stream market. Therefore Proposition 1.2 can be generalised with more ￿rms competing in
the downstream market. One notices that as the number of downstream ￿rms increases (and
therefore the degree of competition increases) it becomes harder to satisfy inequality (1:65);
this implies that the more the downstream entrants the more likely it is that the vertically
integrated ￿rm would not produce downstream. Contrasting conditions (1:29);(1:62);(1:65)
we observe that the higher the degree of competition (going from Cournot with one down-
stream competitor to Cournot with n competitors to Bertrand competition) the less likely
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it is that ￿rm I produces in the downstream market. The stronger the downstream compe-
tition, the smaller the market power of ￿rm E and the share of the revenues that accrues
to the entrant. As a result ￿rm I enjoys higher revenues the stronger the downstream com-
petition when ￿rm E is active and hence "only entry" is more likely for a greater range of
parameters.44
Interestingly, one can also demonstrate that even though foreclosure is never optimal for
the incumbent, price squeeze always arises when considering the test format P ￿ A ￿ Ci.
Proposition 1.3 Under downstream Cournot competition, total foreclosure does not arise
in a generalised game with n downstream ￿rms. Firm I will be active when Z ￿ V ￿ Ci ￿
2n
n+4(Ci ￿ Ce) and partial foreclosure arises.
Proof: generalisation of the duopoly.
1.5.4 Remedies
In this section the welfare e⁄ects of several remedies are analysed. We consider the cases
where there is structural divestment of the vertically integrated ￿rm, regulation of the access
price and price squeeze test.
1.5.4.1 Structural Remedy
We solve the same game taking into account the divestment of the vertically integrated
￿rm. This yields two broad classes of outcomes: i) where both ￿rms operate in the down-
stream market (where the upstream monopolist would set A such that small cost asymmetries
arise) and ii) where only the entrant serves the downstream market.
Lemma 1.5 Under downstream Cournot competition, structural divestment leads to duopoly
when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 3(Ci ￿ Ce): Otherwise only ￿rm E is active.
Proof: The second stage of the game is an asymmetric costs Cournot game.
In the ￿rst stage, the Kuhn Tucker maximisation problem of ￿rm I is given by:
44Note that as n ! 1 the limit of equation (1:65) is Z ￿V ￿Ci ￿ 2(Ci￿Ce): This is not identical to the
condition under Bertrand since there is an additional e⁄ect; under Cournot competition ￿rm I enjoys higher
pro￿ts under n-opoly (i.e when all ￿rms, including ￿rm I, are active downstream) than when it operates as
a downstream monopolist (which is the alternative under Bertrand competition). As a result ￿rm I remains
inactive for a lower range of parameters under Cournot with n ￿rms than under Bertrand competition.
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maxA￿
Cd
I = (A ￿ V )Q
s.t. qI0 ￿ 0;qE ￿ 0
The second inequality is super￿ uous and hence the results for the two cases are given
below:
Case A: Duopoly can arise only when




The access and downstream prices as well as the pro￿ts and social welfare are given by:
A
Cd;D =
















































Case Bi: Only Firm E Cournot pricing (i.e. ￿rm E producing with small cost
asymmetries) can only arise when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < 5
2(Ci ￿ Ce)
The access and downstream prices as well as the pro￿ts and social welfare are given by:
A
Cd;E = Z + Ce ￿ 2Ci (1.72)
P
Cd;E = Z ￿ Ci + Ce (1.73)
￿
Cd;E
I = (Z ￿ V + Ce ￿ 2Ci)(Ci ￿ Ce) (1.74)
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￿
Cd;E
E = (Ci ￿ Ce)
2 (1.75)
W





Comparing Proposition 1.2 and Lemma 1.5, we note that ￿rm E is more likely to be
the sole producer in the downstream market in the divestment case than under vertical
integration. The intuition is that in this case of divestment the downstream ￿rms have more
"asymmetric" costs than under vertical integration (since now both downstream ￿rms have
to pay the same access price). This implies also that the condition for ￿rm E producing
alone (which is determined by whether it is pro￿table for ￿rm I￿to produce) is satis￿ed for
a wider range of parameters.
Case Bii: Only Firm E Monopoly pricing (i.e. ￿rm E producing with large cost
asymmetries) can only arise when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < 3(Ci ￿ Ce)
This case leads to access and downstream price standard under ￿rm E monopoly pricing
















7(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
32
(1.79)
Interestingly this scenario can now arise for a larger parameter range. this arises since the
condition in the maximisation problem is that the now independent downstream operations
have higher costs than the monopoly price of the entrant. This can arise for a larger set of
parameter values since A + Ci > V + Ci.
Comparing the pro￿ts of ￿rm I under these three cases we observe that (1.77) is higher
than both (1.68) and (1.74). Therefore, we obtain Lemma 1.5 that structural divestment
leads to duopoly when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 3(Ci ￿ Ce).
Lemma 1.6 Under downstream Cournot competition, welfare (weakly) decreases under struc-
tural divestment:
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Proof: Comparing the welfare under vertical integration and structural separation we
distinguish three cases:
Case A: When (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 3(Ci ￿ Ce) a duopoly arises irrespective of whether
￿rm I is vertically integrated or not. In this situation applying the remedy yields lower
welfare (equation (1:71) vs (1:54)). The downstream prices are higher in the divestment case
(equations (1:67) vs. (1:51)) re￿ ecting the double marginalisation problem in the divestment
scenario; however, the access price is lower under the structural remedy (equation (1:66)
compared to (1:50)) which re￿ ects the fact that ￿rm I in the vertically integrated scenario
sets a higher access price to exploit the e¢ ciency of the entrant for the last units of output
produced. Under structural remedy the adverse e⁄ect on pricing dominates the productive
e¢ ciency since the quantity produced by E ￿rm does not increase signi￿cantly to outweigh
the negative e⁄ect on price (allocative ine¢ ciency).
Case B: When 3(Ci￿Ce) ￿ (Z￿V ￿Ci) ￿ 1
3(Ci￿Ce) under structural divestment there
is "perfect" double marginalisation (as only Firm E is active setting downstream monopoly
pricing). Under vertical integration instead, there is duopoly when (Z￿V ￿Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci￿Ce)
and for 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 1
3(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿rm E is the only ￿rm producing in
the downstream market at a much lower downstream price (determined by the Cournot
equilibrium). For this range of parameters vertical divestment always leads to "perfect"
double marginalisation and therefore social welfare decreases.
Case C: When (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < 1
3(Ci ￿ Ce) there is no e⁄ect.
Therefore we observe that welfare always decreases. Note however, that the relevant
parameter space is when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce) (i.e. case A and part of Case B) since
only in these cases ￿rm I is active downstream and therefore competition authorities may
take action against a vertically integrated ￿rm.
One other important observation is that both the pro￿ts of ￿rm I and the access price
are (weakly) lower under vertical separation than under vertical integration in all three cases
(weakly for case C). This demonstrates that the commitment problem that ￿rm I faces under
vertical separation is greater than under vertical integration i.e. vertical integration is a way
to restore part of the monopoly power of the upstream monopolist.
1.5.4.2 Regulation
We analyse the welfare implications of regulating the access price. As a benchmark we
investigate the e⁄ects of setting A = V .
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The second stage of the game is an asymmetric costs Cournot game while the ￿rst stage
is deterministic (A = V ). We distinguish two cases; one where there is duopoly downstream
(small cost asymmetry) and one where only ￿rm E operates (large cost asymmetry). Firm
I upstream makes no pro￿ts since A = V .
Case A: Duopoly. Under duopoly price and social welfare are
P
Cr;D =
















Firm I is active in the market when:
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > (Ci ￿ Ce) (1.82)
Comparing this inequality with Proposition 1.2, one observes that ￿rm E is the only ￿rm
active downstream for a higher range of parameters under regulation. This arises since ￿rm
I loses its upstream monopoly power due to the access price regulation. As a result it cannot
increase the cost structure of ￿rm E and therefore a large cost asymmetry (and therefore
￿rm E operating as a monopolist downstream) is more likely to arise.
Case B: Only Firm E Monopoly pricing. Under entry ￿rm E receives monopoly
pro￿ts and therefore price and welfare are given by:
P
Creg;E =





3(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)
8
(1.84)
Lemma 1.7 Under downstream Cournot competition, welfare increases under marginal cost
regulation
Case A: When (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > (Ci ￿ Ce) there is a duopoly downstream under both
scenarios. Social welfare, ((1:81) vs (1:54)), is higher under regulation. This arises since the
access price is set by regulation i.e. ￿rm I cannot use A to extract revenues from ￿rm E. Also,
￿rm E produces a higher quantity and enjoys higher pro￿ts. The ￿nal price, (1:80); is lower
under regulation and social welfare increases (both productive and allocative e¢ ciency).
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Case B: (Ci￿Ce) > (Z ￿V ￿Ci) > 2
5(Ci￿Ce) under regulation only ￿rm E operates
downstream whereas with no regulation both ￿rms operate. Also this scenario, price, (1:83);
is lower under regulation and welfare improves ((1:84) compared to (1:54)).
Case C: (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce) under both scenarios only ￿rm E produces down-
stream. Price is lower under regulation and welfare improves. There is no mark up on the
upstream market and therefore double marginalisation is avoided.
1.5.4.3 Price Squeeze
The third remedy we consider is the e⁄ect of introducing an equally e¢ cient competitor
price squeeze test: P ￿A ￿ Ci: As it is clear from the results in the standard Cournot game
introducing a test of the form: P ￿ A ￿ Ce has no impact since total foreclosure is never
optimal for the vertically integrated ￿rm (see Proposition 1.2).
Lemma 1.8 Under downstream Cournot competition, an equally e¢ cient competitor price
squeeze test leads to duopoly when (Z ￿V ￿Ci) > 3(Ci￿Ce) and may lead to duopoly when
3(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce): Otherwise, only ￿rm E is active.
Proof: The e⁄ect of introducing an equally e¢ cient competitor test is to limit the strategy
space for ￿rm I. In the second stage of the game it does not necessarily have costs V + Ci
but the maximum of (V + Ci; A + Ci):
In the ￿rst stage, ￿rm I maximises the following Kuhn Tucker problem:
maxA￿
Cps
I = (P ￿ V ￿ Ci)qi + (A ￿ V )qe
s.t. qI0 ￿ 0;P ￿ A ￿ 0
We distinguish 2 cases:
Case A: Duopoly may arise when (Z ￿V ￿Ci) > 5
























(Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) (1.87)
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Note that the access and downstream price under an equally e¢ cient test with duopoly
are not the same as with the structural remedy. This contrasts with the Bertrand analysis
since under Cournot and an equally e¢ cient test ￿rm I still runs downstream operations,
while as shown in 4.2.3, it is not active in the downstream market under Bertrand competi-
tion.
Case B: Only Firm E Monopoly pricing may arise when (Z￿V ￿Ci) ￿ 3(Ci￿Ce):
This scenario is identical to structural separation; price, access price, pro￿ts and welfare
are provided in equations (1.19), (1.20), (1.77), (1.78) and (1.79).
Comparing the pro￿ts of ￿rm I in case A and B we observe that it depends on the range
parameter whether ￿rm I would be better o⁄ under duopoly or under only ￿rm E acting as
monopolist when 3(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce)
Comparing Lemma 1.8 with Proposition 1.2 we observe that duopoly is less likely to arise
under price squeeze testing. This occurs since the price squeeze testing limits the pro￿ts that
￿rm I can make through its own downstream operations and therefore it would prefer for a
larger range of parameters to allow ￿rm E to operate as a downstream monopolist.
Lemma 1.9 Under downstream Cournot competition, when an equally e¢ cient competitor
test is introduced welfare may improve when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 5
2(Ci ￿ Ce)
Case A: When (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) > 5
2(Ci ￿ Ce) a duopoly arises under vertical integration
and under price squeeze duopoly always arises when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 3(Ci ￿ Ce) and may
arise when 3(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce):
Price squeeze testing limits the pricing policy that ￿rm I can follow through its own
downstream operations by requiring a speci￿c margin. This leads to higher ￿nal price under
price squeeze (1.85) compared to the vertical integration outcome (1.51). Furthermore, the
access price ((1:86) is lower compared to the vertical integration duopoly (1:50)).
On the other hand, ￿rm E produces more under an equally e¢ cient competitor price
squeeze test. By increasing the "e⁄ective downstream" costs of ￿rm I, the price squeeze test
reduces the competitive constraint that ￿rm I places on ￿rm E. This productive e¢ ciency
e⁄ect may dominate the adverse e⁄ect on consumers (higher ￿nal price) and social welfare
may improve.
Note that the case considered here for price squeeze requires that a signi￿cant margin
is allowed to the entrant which therefore leads to "unnecessarily" high prices. A test which
requires ￿rm I to ensure a lower margin ￿ = Ce + " is likely to lead to more bene￿cial
results (see also section 4.2.3. for a comparison between price squeeze testing with ￿ = Ce
vs ￿ = Ci):
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Comparing price squeeze and structural separation one observes that both the ￿nal
price and the access price is higher under structural divestment than under price squeeze is
equation. As a result, welfare under structural divestment is lower than under price squeeze
testing (adverse e⁄ect under structural remedy while possible welfare improvement under an
equally e¢ cient competitor test).
Case B: When 5
2(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 1
3(Ci ￿ Ce): Welfare may increase if the
optimal outcome under price squeeze is a duopoly (only feasible as long as (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) >
5
2(Ci ￿ Ce)) When only ￿rm E is active under price squeeze welfare decreases due to the
double marginalisation.
Case C: When (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) < 1
3(Ci ￿ Ce) there is no e⁄ect.
Note however, that the relevant parameter space is when (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci) ￿ 2
5(Ci ￿ Ce)
(i.e. case A and part of Case B) since only in these cases ￿rm I is active downstream and
therefore competition authorities may take action against a vertically integrated ￿rm. Also
one notes that ￿rm I is made worse o⁄ through the introduction of the price squeeze test.
Its pro￿ts are compromised by its inability to compete in the downstream market.
1.6 Di⁄erentiated products
1.6.1 Price Competition Analysis
In this part of the paper we extend the Bertrand analysis considering a linear demand
model of di⁄erentiated goods, following Singh and Vives (1984). Compared to the homoge-
neous good analysis above, one would expect foreclosure incentives to substantially decrease.
We examine whether total foreclosure can still arise and under which conditions as an equi-
librium result and whether price squeeze testing may improve welfare.
On the demand side, we assume the following functional form for the utility function:





I + ￿qE + 2￿qIqE) (1.88)
with ￿ ￿ 0;￿ ￿ 0;￿ ￿ j￿j
The parameter ￿ represents the level of di⁄erentiation between the two products. When
it is equal to zero then the two products are independent (or maximally di⁄erentiated). When
￿ > 0 then the two products are substitutes since consuming the goods together increases the
utility of the agent. For ￿ ! ￿ the two goods become perfect substitutes. When ￿ < 0 the
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products are complements: In what follows we restrict our analysis to substitute products.45
Furthermore, for simplicity we assume that parameters ￿;￿ are equal to one and therefore
the following linear indirect demand functions are obtained:
pI = 1 ￿ qI ￿ ￿qE (1.89)
pE = 1 ￿ qE ￿ ￿qI (1.90)
with ￿ 2 [0;1). ￿ ! 1 implies that the goods are perfect substitutes while when ￿ = 0
the downstream products are independent.
Inverting the system we get the direct demand functions:
qI =
(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿2 ￿
pI
1 ￿ ￿2 +
￿pE
1 ￿ ￿2 (1.91)
qE =
(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿2 ￿
pE
1 ￿ ￿2 +
￿pI
1 ￿ ￿2 (1.92)
On the supply side, we consider the same market structure with a vertically integrated
￿rm and a downstream market competitor. For simplicity we assume that the costs of the
upstream market are equal to zero; further we assume that ￿rm E, the more e¢ cient ￿rm,
has zero downstream costs. Hence, V = Ce = 0. We denote the downstream costs of the
vertically integrated ￿rm by C; which re￿ ects the downstream cost di⁄erence between ￿rms
I and E.
The timing of the game is the same and in the second stage ￿rms compete in prices.
Proposition 1.4 Under Singh and Vives model of di⁄erentiated products and downstream
Bertrand competition: i) duopoly is the most likely outcome ii) total foreclosure arises when
the products are highly substitutable and the cost di⁄erence is relatively small iii) ￿rm E
produces as a downstream monopolist when the products are relatively close substitutes and
the cost di⁄erence signi￿cant.
Proof: In the second stage of the game the equilibrium quantities and price of the
competing ￿rms are given below:
qI =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + A￿ + C(￿2 ￿ 2)
4 ￿ 5￿2 + ￿4 (1.93)
45The results can be extended for complement products. However, foreclosure would never arise if the two
downstream products are complements and therefore such a scenario is not of interest for this paper.
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qE =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + C￿ + A(￿2 ￿ 2)
4 ￿ 5￿2 + ￿4 (1.94)
pI =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + 2C + A￿
4 ￿ ￿2 (1.95)
pE =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + 2A + C￿
4 ￿ ￿2 (1.96)
In the ￿rst stage of the game ￿rm I maximises the following Kuhn Tucker problem:
maxA￿I = (P ￿ C)qI + AqE
s.t. qI ￿ 0;qE ￿ 0:
The two quantity constraints imply a range of values for A so that both ￿rms are active
downstream.46
We distinguish the following cases:
Case A: Duopoly
The optimal access price is given by
A
D;D =
8 ￿ 8￿2 ￿ ￿3 + ￿4 + c￿3
2￿4 + 16 ￿ 14￿2 (1.97)
This is optimal only when the following two conditions hold
(32 ￿ 32C) ￿ 8￿ ￿ ￿
2(44 ￿ 44C) + 6￿
3 + ￿
4(17 ￿ 17C) ￿ ￿
5 ￿ ￿
6(2 ￿ 2C) > 0 (1.98)
16 ￿ ￿(16 ￿ 16C) ￿ 20￿
2 + ￿
3(16 ￿ 16C) + 8￿
4 ￿ ￿
5(3 ￿ 3C) ￿ ￿
6: ￿ 0 (1.99)
Case Bi: Only ￿rm E Bertrand pricing.
The optimal access price is
46Combining the two constraints we obtain:
(4 ￿ 4C) ￿ ￿2(5 ￿ 5C) + ￿4(1 ￿ C) ￿ 0
Note that for the range of values of ￿ relevant here this expression is always satis￿ed.
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A
D;E = 1 +
(1 ￿ C)(￿2 ￿ 2)
￿
(1.100)
and it is optimal to set such an access price when
(32 ￿ 32C) ￿ 8￿ ￿ ￿
2(44 ￿ 44C) + 6￿
3 + ￿
4(17 ￿ 17C) ￿ ￿
5 ￿ ￿
6(2 ￿ 2C) ￿ 0 (1.101)
(4 ￿ 4C) ￿ 5￿
2 + 5￿
2C + ￿
4(1 ￿ C) ￿ 0 (1.102)
One would expect this case to arise when the products are close substitutes and the costs
of the incumbent are relatively large.
Case Bii: Only ￿rm E Monopoly pricing.
This scenario is identical to the homogenous Bertrand case. Therefore substituting for






















This scenario arises when ￿rm E has a su¢ cient cost advantage which ensures that ￿rm
I cannot undercut the monopoly pricing of ￿rm E. When ￿ = 0, both ￿rms are active
downstream and set monopoly pricing since they are monopolies on independent segments
of the market. Similarly the lower the ￿ the more likely it is that both ￿rms are active
downstream. In the limit, for ￿ ! 1; ￿rm E may set monopoly pricing downstream as long
as the e¢ ciency gap between the two ￿rms is su¢ ciently high, namely C > pm = 3
4 (see also
Zanchettin (2006) who considers an asymmetric costs Singh and Vives model). Firm I will
be unable to undercut ￿rm E￿ s monopoly pricing (1.104) for the combination of C and ￿
that make equation (1:91) is set equal to zero. The minimum price that ￿rm I can set equals
its marginal costs, C.
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, C ￿ ￿
1
4
￿ + 1 (1.108)
Case C: Foreclosure, only ￿rm I producing
The optimal access price is
A
D;F =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + C￿
2 ￿ ￿2 (1.109)
This may arise when
16 ￿ ￿(16 ￿ 16C) ￿ 20￿
2 + ￿
3(16 ￿ 16C) + 8￿
4 ￿ ￿
5(3 ￿ 3C) ￿ ￿
6 < 0 (1.110)
(4 ￿ 4C) ￿ 5￿
2 + 5￿
2C + ￿
4(1 ￿ C) > 0 (1.111)
One would expect foreclosure to arise when the products are highly substitutable and
when the costs of the incumbent are relatively low.
The diagram below graphs these conditions. The x-axis represents the degree of dif-
ferentiation (￿) while the y-axis represents the cost di⁄erence (C). We distinguish three
areas. The white area represents the duopoly outcome. If C and ￿ are uniformly drawn then
duopoly is the most likely outcome. It is interesting to note that if the goods are independent
(i.e. ￿ = 0) duopoly is the only plausible outcome. As competition becomes stronger (i.e.
￿ increases) the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E becomes more relevant and drives ￿rm I out
of the downstream market. As a result, as ￿ increases it becomes more likely that ￿rm E
is the only active ￿rm downstream. This arises as long as the cost di⁄erence is signi￿cant.
The higher the degree of di⁄erentiation the lower the cost di⁄erence needs to be for this
scenario to arise. The upper shaded area represents the parameter space in which ￿rm E is
the only active downstream ￿rm. We further distinguish two areas. Above the downwards
sloping straight line which represents condition (1.108) case Bii arises, and "perfect" double
marginalisation arises. In this area, ￿rm E enjoys high market power since its cost e¢ ciency
compared to ￿rm I is very signi￿cant. Between the downwards sloping line and above the
concave line case Bi arises. In this area ￿rm E is again the only downstream active ￿rm,
however, its cost advantage is not su¢ cient to allow it to set monopoly pricing.
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The rent extraction of ￿rm E￿ s e¢ ciency of course is limited by the commitment problem
that ￿rm I faces, as discussed in detail in the homogeneous product cases. When the down-
stream products are highly substitutable, the access price that ￿rm I can set is relatively
small. This has a negative impact on ￿rm I￿ s pro￿ts and therefore ￿rm I might prefer to
(totally) foreclose entry when ￿ is relatively large. Foreclosure arises only for a very small
cost di⁄erence (small values of C); for larger cost di⁄erence ￿rm I would bene￿t more from
the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E. Hence, foreclosure arises only in the small shaded area
in the bottom right of the diagram.
Nature of price squeeze. In a model with di⁄erentiated products with downstream price
competition, foreclosure arises only for a limited range of parameters. Hence, the reasonably
e¢ cient version of price squeeze testing has a limited e⁄ect. However, as in homogenous
goods Cournot competition, in the duopoly scenario the equally e¢ cient competitor is not











6) > 0 (1.112)
It can be shown that this inequality is never satis￿ed for ￿ 2 [0;1) and C 2 [0;1] and
therefore price squeeze (and hence partial foreclosure) arises in the duopoly scenario.
It is also trivial to show that under case C since foreclosure arises price squeeze also
arise. Note that under cases Bi and Bii ￿rm I is not active downstream and therefore price
squeeze allegations are hard to sustain (under the optimally set access price it can be shown
that the downstream operations of ￿rm I would not pro￿table).
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Furthermore, predation charges cannot be sustained since the vertically integrated ￿rm
is able to cover its total costs.
1.6.2 Remedy
1.6.2.1 Price Squeeze
In this section we examine the e⁄ects of introducing an equally e¢ cient competitor price
squeeze test.
The same analysis as undertaken in section 5.4.3 is performed.
Lemma 1.10 Under Singh and Vives model of di⁄erentiated products and downstream Bertrand
competition, an equally e¢ cient price squeeze test leads to an increase in welfare unless post
remedy Entry Monopoly Pricing arises.
In the second stage of the game the equilibrium quantities and price of the competing
￿rms are given below:
qI =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + C￿2 ￿ 2C + A(￿2 ￿ 2 + ￿)
4 ￿ 5￿2 + ￿4 (1.113)
qE =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + C￿ + A(￿2 ￿ 2 + ￿)
4 ￿ 5￿2 + ￿4 (1.114)
pI =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + 2C + A￿ + 2A
4 ￿ ￿2 (1.115)
pE =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 + 2A + +A￿ + C￿
4 ￿ ￿2 (1.116)
In the ￿rst stage of the game ￿rm I maximises the following Kuhn Tucker problem:
maxA￿I = (P ￿ C)qI + AqE
s.t. qI ￿ 0;qE ￿ 0:
We distinguish the following cases:
Case A: Duopoly
The optimal access price is given by
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A
D;Dps =
￿4 ￿ 2￿ + c￿3
2(￿3 + ￿)(2 + ￿)
(1.117)
This arises when :
￿6C ￿ ￿C + 3￿
2C + 4 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2￿
2 < 0
Case Bi: Only ￿rm E produces.
The optimal access price is
A
D;Eps = 1 +
C(2 ￿ ￿2)
￿2 + ￿ + ￿2 (1.118)
This arises when
￿6C ￿ ￿C + 3￿
2C + 4 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2￿
2 ￿ 0
Case Bii: Only ￿rm E monopoly pricing.
This case leads to the same access price, downstream price and pro￿ts as in case Bii
in the pre-remedy scenario. The only di⁄erence is that ￿rm E is able to set a downstream
monopoly price for a wider range of parameters. This arises due to the equally e¢ cient
price squeeze obligation of ￿rm I. According to this obligation the minimum price that ￿rm
I can set is A + C, compared to C in the pre-remedy situation. Therefore "perfect" double
marginalisation can arise when:




, C ￿ ￿
3
4
￿ + 1 (1.120)
The graph below depicts these conditions. The white area represents the area in which
duopoly arises under price squeeze. Above the concave line, i.e. in the shaded area, ￿rm E is
the only ￿rm active in the downstream market. For relatively high cost, above the downward
sloping straight line (which represents condition (1.120)), ￿rm E sets a downstream monopoly
pricing and therefore case Bii of the pre-remedied game arises; otherwise i.e. between the
two lines, case Bi arises. Note that Entry monopoly pricing (case Bii) is more likely under
an equally e¢ cient competitor price squeeze test than in the pre-remedy game since it may
arise for a lower e¢ ciency gap (comparing conditions (1.108) and (1.120)). This occurs since
￿rm I is required to abide with the equally e¢ cient competitor test. Furthermore, duopoly
is less likely to arise under an e¢ cient competitor price squeeze test than in the pre-remedy
case for the same underlying reason; the position of ￿rm E improves as it competes against
a "higher cost" competitor.
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Welfare comparison Welfare unambiguously improves in the area in which, irrespective of
whether or not price squeeze test is introduced, duopoly arises i.e the lower shaded area in
the diagram below. The shaded area also includes the parameter range under which total
foreclosure arises under no remedy. In this area welfare also unambiguously increases.
In the area between the two concave lines there is duopoly under vertical integration
without price squeeze while ￿rm E is the only ￿rm active in the downstream market under
an e¢ cient competitor price squeeze test. Below the downwards sloping straight line ￿rm
E sets a relatively low price, constraint by the downstream operations of ￿rm I; in this
area welfare (almost unambiguously)47 improves and the productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E is
passed on through lower downstream prices. However, above this line, ￿rm E is able to set
monopoly pricing downstream. This is the adverse e⁄ect of price squeeze testing which arises
since under price squeeze entry with monopoly pricing is more likely than in the pre-remedy
scenario. Furthermore, entry monopoly pricing is welfare detrimental since it leads to double
marginalisation and therefore higher prices. Note that this e⁄ect is higher under an e¢ cient
competitor price squeeze testing. Under a reasonably e¢ cient price squeeze testing this e⁄ect
disappears since no margin is essentially assigned to ￿rm E (see discussion in section 4.2.3)
Finally, in the area above the upper concave line, ￿rm I is inactive under the pre-remedy
scenario. As already discussed, this is not a relevant area since only in cases where ￿rm I is
active downstream competition authorities may take action.
47Note for completeness that for relatively high ￿ (￿ greater than 0.94) welfare may decrease for relatively
high cost di⁄erences even under this case; however, this arises for a very limited parameter range and
therefore for simplicity it is not depicted in the graph.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed whether a vertically integrated incumbent ￿rm has an
incentive to foreclose the downstream market from e¢ cient potential entrants. We have
shown that total foreclosure can be part of the equilibrium analysis as long as there is strong
downstream competition. Foreclosure arises because the vertically integrated ￿rm cannot
commit not to compete with the potential entrant once it has granted him access to its
network. Furthermore, the upstream input that the incumbent possesses needs to be an
essential facility that represents a signi￿cant part of the total production costs and the cost
e¢ ciency brought in the market by the entrant should be relatively small. Moreover, when
the demand is very strong the incumbent will have an extra incentive to price squeeze. The
degree of competition a⁄ects the strength of the commitment problem; stronger competition
aggravates the commitment problem and makes total foreclosure more likely. When there
is strong competition the incumbent cannot appropriate a lot of pro￿t from the entrant
through the access price and would prefer to serve the market directly. However, when there
is weaker downstream competition the vertically integrated ￿rm, may still be able to better
exploit the productive e¢ ciency of the entrant and by charging a relatively high access price
it partially forecloses the entrant (raising rival￿ s costs). Indeed, we have shown that partial
foreclosure is likely to be a more pronounced e⁄ect of the pricing strategy of a vertically
integrated ￿rm.
Furthermore, contrary to the critics of price squeeze test, we have shown that predation
charges are not su¢ cient to address the anticompetitive concern. Also, an equally e¢ cient
competitor test may improve social welfare when either total or partial foreclosure arises.
At the same time we have considered the practical advantages of the price squeeze test
compared to regulation, as for example it does not require to compute the upstream costs,
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and structural divestment. Therefore, in the light of the recent criticisms, it appears that
the merits of price squeeze testing may have been underestimated.
The paper provides a simple background for analysis price squeeze allegations and has
examined the e⁄ects of price squeeze testing under di⁄erent types of competition. In order
to verify the robustness of the results the model may be further extended and generalised.
For example, more generic (non linear) demand functions may be taken into account. The
main results of this paper should hold for more general demand functions since the nature
of the commitment problem is unlikely to be signi￿cantly a⁄ected. Another interesting line
of research may consider a setup where the potential entrant is only less e¢ cient than ￿rm
I because it does not have the same scale of production as ￿rm I. This can be modeled by
introducing a ￿xed cost for ￿rm E to set up its business or by allowing for an interoperability
cost.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Appendix 1 Further issues on Price Squeeze testing
Another complication is that the price squeeze test should take into account possible
interconnection costs. For example, if ￿rm I has to incur additional marginal costs, Cc, to
provide interconnection then these costs should be deducted from the ￿rm￿ s costs in order
to get signi￿cant results from the price squeeze test. Therefore equation (1.2) should be
adapted as follows
P > A ￿ Cc + Ci
to guarantee that entry is encouraged only when the end costs of a vertically disintegrated
competitor are not larger than the costs of providing the product in an integrated structure.48
Further complications arise when bypass of the upstream "essential facility" is possible
or if the ￿nal downstream product is di⁄erentiated. In the bypass scenario the units of
measurement become very important and it is unlikely that there would be a one to one
relation between the input and the ￿nal good. Instead the ￿rms would use the di⁄erent
inputs at di⁄erent proportions and a meaningful price margin test has thus to incorporate
this. Furthermore, it is more likely, when the downstream goods are di⁄erentiated, that
rivals may make an adequate pro￿t even though the price structure of ￿rm I fails the equally
e¢ cient competitor test. In general, as Brunekreeft at al (2005) argue if we violate the classic
Chicago style arguments (discussed in more detail in the following section), the price squeeze
test ￿cannot achieve the goal of providing e¢ cient signals for the downstream entry￿ .
An additional unresolved issue, according to Bouckaert and Verboven (2003) and Geradin
and O￿ Donoghue (2005) is whether the mixture of ex ante regulation and ex post intervention
is consistent with the price squeeze test. This becomes a major concern since most cases
of price squeeze allegations have been associated with the newly liberalized networks such
as the telecommunication sector where regulation plays an important role. Concerning the
e⁄ect of regulation on the price squeeze test Bouckaert and Verboven (2003) distinguish three
cases. When both the upstream and downstream prices are regulated, the price squeeze is
simply a regulatory price squeeze i.e. it arises as an artifact of regulatory choice. When
instead only the upstream price is regulated then the incumbent ￿rm can a⁄ect only the
downstream price, which may only raise predatory concerns. Finally, when both markets
are unregulated, the incumbent ￿rm may price squeeze, predate or use excessive pricing.
48To see this imagine the case where ￿rm E is more e¢ cient than ￿rm I, however, it produces at a higher
cost when the interconnection costs are also accounted for (i.e. Ce + Cc > Ci). If an equally e¢ cient
competitor test is considered then ￿rm E would be able to undercut the vertically integrated ￿rm. However,
the total costs of the entrant would be higher compared to the monopolist, thereby inviting ine¢ cient entry.
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Geradin and O￿ Donoghue (2005) argue that the greater the pricing ￿ exibility (and therefore
the less the regulatory intervention) the more likely is that price squeeze could occur.
1.9.2 Appendix 2 Social welfare under Perfect Competition
W
E =




(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
2
Opening the parentheses and simplifying:
() 2CiCe ￿ Ci
2 < Ce
2
() (Ci ￿ Ce)
2 > 0
which holds
1.9.3 Appendix 3 Social Welfare under reasonable e¢ cient competitor test
W
m(V +Ce) = W
￿=Ce < W
E




(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce) < (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce) + (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Ci ￿ Ce)
() (Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)[
3
4
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce) ￿ Z + V + Ci] < (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Ci ￿ Ce)
() (Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)
1
4
[(V + Ci ￿ Z) + 3(Ci ￿ Ce)] < (Z ￿ V ￿ Ci)(Ci ￿ Ce)
which holds under equation 1:29 given that
(V + Ci ￿ Z) + 3(Ci ￿ Ce) < 0
() Z ￿ V ￿ Ci > 3(Ci ￿ Ce)
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1.9.4 Appendix 4 Structural remedy
In this Appendix we solve the structural remedy game for all value parameters and we
examine the e⁄ects of introducing i) price discrimination or ii) two part tari⁄.
Under Bertrand competition ￿rm E always operates in the downstream market. When
there are small cost asymmetries the game is as described in 4.2.1. However this outcome
arises as long as A + Ci < Z+A+Ce
2 : Substituting for the optimal access price (1.36) we
observe that this scenario may arise only when Z ￿ V ￿ Ci > 2(Ci ￿ Ce) i.e. when the
cost di⁄erence is relatively small. Under large cost asymmetries, both ￿rm I (upstream)
and E (downstream) operate as a monopolist leading to the outcome of case (Aii) of the
game in 4.1. By comparing the pro￿ts of ￿rm I in both cases the latter case is optimal
when Z ￿ V < 1 p
2￿1(
p
2Ci ￿ Ce) while the small cost asymmetries outcome arises when




In 4.2.1 we have demostrated that structural remedy is welfare enhancing when the cost
di⁄erence between the two ￿rms is small (when 5Ci ￿ 4Ce < Z ￿ V ).
When 5Ci ￿ 4Ce > Z ￿ V > 1 p
2￿1(
p
2Ci ￿ Ce) ￿rm I￿ s pro￿ts and social welfare fall
following divesment. Under vertical integration Entry Bertrand pricing takes place while
under divestment, the outcome described in 4.2.1 arises. Welfare falls since the downstream
price under structural separation is higher. The pricing condition in the vertical integration
scenario (1.7) does not depend on A and therefore determines the ￿nal price while under
structural divestment there is a further maximisation problem at stage 1 leading to monopoly




2Ci ￿ Ce) > Z ￿ V > 1=3(Ci ￿ Ce) the outcome under divestment is
welfare detrimental since it leads to "perfect" double marginalisation and therefore to higher
price compared to the Entry Bertrand pricing outocme under vertical integration. Firm I is
worse o⁄since it cannot extract the whole productive e¢ ciency of ￿rm E (￿rm I￿has costs of
A+Ci versus total costs of V +Ci under vertical integration). One notes that the "perfect"
double marginalisation scenario is more likely to arise under strucrural divestment. This
happens since ￿rm E can only set monopoly price when this is lower than A+Ci (the costs
of the independent I￿ ) under structural divestment while lower than V + Ci under vertical
integration.
Note that ￿rm I is weakly worse o⁄ in the divestment scenario; this arise since by
vertically integrating it internalises part of the downstream externality thereby enjoying
higher pro￿ts (partially restoring monopoly power).
As discussed in 4.2.1, double marginalisation arises because of linear pricing. Firm I
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can do better under the divestiture scenario and receive the monopoly pro￿t of a ￿rm with
underlying costs V + Ce, through i) price discrimination or ii) two part tari⁄ (if observable
contracts are assumed).
If we assume that ￿rm I can credibly price discriminate in the access price then ￿rm I
could set Ai and Ae such that
P = Ci + Ai = Ce + Ae (1.121)
with Ae > Ai:
We assume that, as a tie break rule, ￿rm E serves the market. In the ￿rst stage of the
game ￿rm I will maximise its pro￿ts with respect to Ae which yields
P =
Z + V + Ce
2
(1.122)
The pro￿ts of ￿rm I are given by:
￿I =
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
4
(1.123)
and are higher than under foreclosure (equation (1:28)). We note that essentially ￿rm
I is able to set the access prices, Ae, above the marginal cost of the upstream production
o⁄setting the externality problem created by the downstream competition. Here ￿rm I solves
the commitment problem (as long as such a price discrimination is credible) and is able to
appropriate monopoly pro￿ts of a ￿rm of the e¢ ciency of ￿rm E.
Alternatively, a two part tari⁄of the form R+Aq (see also section 4.2.4) can be imposed.
In the second stage of the game, since A + Ce ￿ A + Ci; ￿rm E serves the market at price
P = A + Ci. By imposing an access price
A =
Z + V + Ce ￿ 2Ci
2
(1.124)
￿rm I "dictates" the monopoly price that maximises the pro￿ts of a vertical integrated
monopolist with downstream costs Ce. Note that this access price is lower than (1.36).
Firms E and I make respectively pro￿ts
￿E =




(Z ￿ V + Ce ￿ 2Ci)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)
4
+ R (1.126)
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If ￿rm I has all the bargaining power then ￿rm I can appropriate all the pro￿ts and
achieves
￿I =
(Z ￿ V ￿ Ce)2
4
(1.127)
Therefore, under divestment if price discrimination and/or two part tari⁄are introduced,
the dominant ￿rm can increase the pro￿ts it can receive, at the expense of the entrant but at
the bene￿t of social welfare. However this assumes that contracts are observable and cannot
be renegotiated. Note that the nature of the commitment problem is somewhat di⁄erent
than under vertical integration. In the latter scenario. the vertically integrated ￿rm cannot
commit not to compete downstream since its own operations are active in the second stage of
the game; under divestment the upstream monopolist is not active downstream (see section
4.2.4).
1.9.5 Appendix 5 Price Squeeze testing
We analyse the game in 4.2.3 for ￿ = Ci: In the second stage of the game we distinguish
2 scenarios over which ￿rm I can choose by setting A appropriately;
A) small cost asymmetries when P = A + Ci which requires A + Ci < Z+A+Ce
2
B) large cost asymmetries when P = Z+A+Ce
2 which requires that A + Ci > Z+A+Ce
2
Under A) small cost asymmetries in the ￿rst stage of the game
maxA(A ￿ V )(Z ￿ A ￿ Ci)
s.t. A + Ci <
Z + A + Ce
2
Case Ai: When the constraint does not bind A = Z+V ￿Ce





This is the case mentioned in 4.2.3.
This is optimal when
Z ￿ V ￿ Ci > 2(Ci ￿ Ce)
Case Aii: When the constraint binds A = Z + Ce ￿ 2Ci; P = Z + Ce ￿ Ci; ￿Aii
I =
(Ci ￿ Ce)(Z ￿ V ￿ Ci ￿ Ci + Ce)
Under B) large cost asymmetries, in the ￿rst stage
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max(A ￿ V )(Z ￿
Z + A + Ce
2
￿ Ci)
s.t. A + Ci >
Z + A + Ce
2
Case Bi: When the constraint does not bind A = Z+V ￿Ce





This is optimal when the cost di⁄erence is relatively large:
Z ￿ V ￿ Ci < 3(Ci ￿ Ce)
Case Bii: When the constraint binds A = Z + Ce ￿ 2Ci is identical to Case Aii.
Comparing the pro￿ts of ￿rm I:
Case Ai arises when Z￿V > 1 p
2￿1(
p





This is the same outcome as under structural divestment and therefore the same welfare
considerations apply.
1.9.6 Appendix 6 Cournot Duopoly pro￿ts
￿
C;D





















5Z + 5V + 5Ci ￿ 2(Ci ￿ Ce) ￿ 10V ￿ 10Ci
10
)(










[4(5Z ￿ 5V ￿ Ci ￿ 4Ce)(Ci ￿ Ce) + (5Z ￿ 5V ￿ 5Ci ￿ 2(Ci ￿ Ce))
2]
which simpli￿es to
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LENIENCY POLICY￿ S DETERRENT EFFECTS ON FAILING
CARTELS
2.1 Introduction
The ￿ght against cartels has long been at the forefront of competition authorities￿concern
in both sides of the Atlantic.1 Commissioner Neelie Kroes2 stated that cartel enforcement
"is at the very top of the priorities of the Commission". Besides, the huge increase in the
number of detected cartel cases and in the average size of ￿nes imposed on ￿rms in connection
to cartel activity in the EC (see Appendix 2.7.1) demonstrates the EC commitment against
cartels.
Leniency policy is a program that grants a reduction in the ￿ne imposed to the colluding
￿rm(s) that reports the cartel activity to the antitrust authorities. This can destabilise the
cartel activity by putting the ￿rms against each other since only the ￿rst one to report the
anticompetitive practice will bene￿t from full immunity from the ￿ne.3 An e⁄ective leniency
program will lead cartel members to confess their conduct to the authorities (desistance) but
also will discourage ￿rms from joining a cartel agreement in the ￿rst place (deterrence). The
introduction of leniency programs is viewed as the biggest success for cartel detection and
deterrence leading to a dramatic increase in the number of cases brought to the attention
of the antitrust authorities. Hammond (2000) views the Amnesty program in the US as
"unquestionably the most important investigative tool available for detecting and cracking
cartel activity". The greatest advantage of a leniency program is that it brings crucial
evidence to the antitrust authorities. In cartel cases the establishment of guilt can become
very di¢ cult without the discovery of an explicit agreement and therefore leniency can greatly
facilitate this information gathering. Much attention has been attracted in leniency after
the revision of the leniency program in the US in 1993. Since then, leniency programs have
been introduced in more than 30 countries and in the European Commission. The ￿gure in
Appendix 2.7.2 demonstrates the crucial role of the leniency program in practice. It shows
1European Competition Law Annual (2006), introduction p.i
2In the opening speech at the 11th Competition Law and Policy Workshop, EUI, 2006.
3In many systems, including the EC, there is some ￿ne reduction for the second informant as long as
it provides the authorities evidence with "signi￿cant value added", but only the ￿rst reporting ￿rm could
obtain immunity.
56
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that the great majority of cases prosecuted by the EC since 2000 involve ￿rms that received
immunity from ￿nes, due to the leniency program.
Nevertheless, despite this apparent success in practice, there are some more skeptical
views arguing that leniency applications might not be as e⁄ective. First, the main problem
with cartels is that we cannot know how many of them exist in our economy. Therefore,
it is empirically very hard (if not impossible)4 to estimate whether the introduction of the
leniency program has increased deterrence. The higher number of prosecuted cases could
simply be the result of an increase in cartel activity. Furthermore, leniency inherently lowers
the expected ￿ne for the ￿rms and therefore reduces the expected cost of entering into
cartels. Therefore, an important trade o⁄ arises (see Motta and Polo (2003), Chen and Rey
(2007)): while leniency programs induce ￿rms to report their information and evidence to the
antitrust authorities (the procompetitive e⁄ect), they also reduce the expected penalty that
￿rms will face when they enter such an agreement (the anticompetitive e⁄ect). Moreover,
there are concerns that the EC leniency program is not e⁄ective in itself; instead it bene￿ts
from the e⁄ectiveness of the US leniency program, which induces ￿rms to also apply for
leniency in the EC (see Stephan (2005)).5
Finally, and most relevant for our paper, some practitioners and academics have argued
that leniency programs (only) attract failing cartels and would therefore not improve ex ante
deterrence. More speci￿cally, Stephan (2005) ￿nds that many cartels discovered through
leniency applications "had failed or ceased to operate because of market conditions (...),
before being revealed to the Commission by a cartel member". For example, the Carbonless
Paper cartel (2001) faded because the market for self copying paper was in decline in the face
of new technology. In the case with the highest ￿ne at the time, the Vitamins cartel (2001),
the colluding agreement had ceased in most market segments, due to the emergence of new
Chinese products. The Sodium Gluconate cartel (2002) su⁄ered from falling pro￿ts due
to escalating production costs throughout the 1990s. Therefore, Stephan (2005) considers
that leniency applications are a consequence of "leaving the sinking ship" with ￿rms looking
to their interest. Furthermore, concerning deterrence he suggests that "the leniency notice
may have bene￿ted collusion by taming the endgame for one of the players". In a similar
spirit, Guersent (2006) suggests that "￿rms usually do not rush to report young and well
functioning cartels; they only come in and apply for leniency policy when things become
more problematic". Also Grout (2006), commenting on the results obtained by Langus and
4See Harrington (2006) and Miller (2007) for a suggested methodology.
5The greatest di⁄erence between the two legal systems is that in the US individuals involved in the
collusive activity can be criminally charged and ￿ned with imprisonment. This provides a greater incentive
to apply for leniency since there is more than company pro￿ts at stake.
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Motta (2007) on the e⁄ect of an antitrust investigation to the stock market valuation of a
￿rm, argues that ￿nancial markets must predict that the "detected cartels must not have
much life left in them".6
This paper aims to investigate the argument that leniency programs only attract failing
cartels. This would enable us to examine whether the introduction of leniency programs
enhances deterrence and would guide us to provide some policy conclusions. In a context
of perfect information, and with given probability of detection, we show that ￿rms would
internalise the presence of leniency programs into their ex ante decision to collude. Therefore,
we would observe no leniency applications at equilibrium since ￿rms would be able to predict
that the cartel they enter is unstable.7 In order to model a framework where ￿rms only
apply for leniency when the cartel is fading we introduce imperfect information. In a setting
where there are possible pro￿tability shocks in the economy, ￿rms will take the decision
on whether to enter cartel agreements by taking an expectation over the possible states of
nature. However, at some point the uncertainty over the state of the economy would dissolve
and ￿rms would have to decide whether they still want to be part of this collusive agreement.
In the presence of a leniency program, we shall show that ￿rms might prefer to report the
illegal activity when the bad state of nature materialises. The important question that arises
is whether these leniency applications are a worthy target for the antitrust authorities given
that these cartels will collapse in any case.
2.2 Literature review
Our paper adds to the literature on the e⁄ectiveness of the leniency schemes initiated by
Motta and Polo (2003). Much of the literature focuses on the issue of deterrence and therefore
in most models there is no reporting arising at equilibrium. We, instead, ￿rst analyse what
triggers a leniency application and then focus on the implications on deterrence.
A ￿rst reason for applying for leniency that has been identi￿ed in the literature is a
change in the probability of detection. Motta and Polo (2003) show that ￿rms apply for
leniency if an investigation has opened in the industry where the cartel activity takes place.
This induces an increase in the probability of detection and therefore following the opening
of an investigation ￿rms will have a greater incentive to report. Harrington (2005) allows the
probability of detection to vary over time and shows that o⁄ering leniency can lead to desis-
6Taking the conservative estimates of Langus and Motta (2007) this e⁄ect can be as low as 2%. Grout
(2006) argues that the future loss of the bene￿t of cartel induced supra competitive prices seems to be of
relatively little importance. This is based on the perception that the share prices are often very responsive
even to minor events.
7As a result, only the introduction of a leniency program might lead to applications. However, in practice
one can observe leniency applications that go beyond the period of the introduction of the leniency programs.
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tance when discovery becomes more likely. A second reason to apply for leniency arises when
the ￿nes depend on the duration of the cartel activity. In such a setting ￿rms might prefer
to collude and then reveal in order to avoid paying the accumulated ￿ne (see Motchenkova
(2004)). Another possibility is that a change in the management might trigger the leniency
application. Or, the management was not aware of the illegal activity and upon discovery it
runs to the antitrust authorities. Indeed in the Monochloroacetic Acid cartel (2005) when
Hoechst chemicals discovered that the newly acquired Clariant business management had
engaged in collusive activities it ￿led for leniency. Last, Siragusa (2006) suggests that there
might be strategic motives behind a leniency application i.e. ￿rms exploit leniency programs
for competitive or exclusionary reasons. However, in the theoretical models that incorporate
strategic behavior (Ellis and Wilson (2003), Leliefeld and Motchenkova (2007)) no leniency
applications arise at equilibrium since ￿rms internalise the strategic considerations in their
ex ante decision.8
Concerning the optimal structure of leniency programs, it is well established in the
literature (see Harrington (2005), Chen and Rey (2007)) that providing leniency only to
the ￿rst informer would make the cartel less sustainable and would create a race to the
courthouse e⁄ect. Introducing the risk dominance concept, Spagnolo (2004) argues that
such a program risk dominates a scheme with multiple ￿ne reductions, which instead reduce
the deterring e⁄ect of the leniency programs. He also ￿nds, contrary to our model, that
courageous leniency programs in which the reporting party is granted rewards are the ￿rst
best solution. However, moderate leniency systems as currently employed by the EC and
US can be helpful. On the other hand, leniency programs can be exploited by ￿rms and
this should determine a maximal level of leniency. Building on this framework, Chen and
Rey (2007) propose a normative framework to study the e⁄ects of the leniency policy by
introducing heterogeneity in the stakes of collusion across industries. This allows them to
"characterise the objective of the antitrust authority, that is, deterring as many as possible
cartels by an upper bound of collusive bene￿ts".
The model we present also relies on the literature of the impact of the evolution of
demand on cartel formation. The starting point of this literature is the paper by Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986). They assume that the level of market demand is independently and
identically distributed so that the expected level of future demand is independent of the
present state of demand. This implies that the expected cost (or bene￿t) of deviating from
8For example, Ellis and Wilson (2003) assume that the reporting ￿rm enjoys a market advantage from
self reporting since the convicted ￿rms would su⁄er from a wedge between marginal cost and marginal
revenues. They ￿nd that the leniency policy might strengthen cartels by increasing the punishment that
may be in￿ icted on a deviator.
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(sticking to) the illegal agreement is always the same regardless of the current state of
demand. However, a high demand today makes a deviation more attractive since the higher
prices make a price cut more attractive. Therefore, when demand is in the good state of the
economy, collusion is harder to sustain. Introducing, however, positive correlation between
the state of the economy today and tomorrow changes the results. In a setting where the
demand boom is expected to be persistent, the carrot from colluding increases substantially,
rendering collusion more likely. Conversely, if the demand is expected to fall persistently
collusion becomes less of an attractive option since the ￿rms would not have much to gain
from sticking into an illegal agreement. In this spirit are the ￿ndings by Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997) who study the incentives to enter a cartel
agreement assuming a model of business cycle where demand movements are cyclical over
time.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 The market setup
We consider a simple game where there are two ￿rms that are symmetric and they
compete in prices in the market of a homogeneous good in an in￿nitely repeated game. The
discount rate is identical for both ￿rms and is denoted by ￿ 2 (0;1): We assume that the
pro￿t per ￿rm from colluding in the ￿rst period is ￿ and the pro￿ts from deviating from
the colluding agreement when the other ￿rm colludes is 2￿, in which case the other ￿rm
earns 0. Further, the pro￿ts in the market follow a downwards trend. More speci￿cally, they
follow the process: ￿
t￿(p) with ￿ 2 (0;1] i.e. they weakly fall in each period by a fraction ￿.
The idea is that the industry faces a negative shock on pro￿tability which could be due to,
for example, a demand reduction or a cost increase. We also assume that ￿rms attempt to
sustain collusion by employing standard trigger strategies, threatening with reversion to the
one period Nash outcome of no collusion when one ￿rm deviates.
2.3.2 The Antitrust Authority and the Leniency Program
The antitrust authority in our model has the legal power to investigate all the sectors of
the economy but (has limited resources and) can detect an infringement of competition law
relying on audits with a probability ￿ 2 [0;1) in each period. When an antitrust authority
￿nds a cartel it sets to the parties involved in the illegal activity a ￿ne equal to Ft = ￿￿t; with
￿ being the coe¢ cient of the proportional ￿ne. This assumption re￿ ects the current revision
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in the way the European Commission calculates the ￿nes it sets.9 Note that this assumption
is crucial to render the problem stationary; if the ￿ne was ￿xed then with strictly falling
pro￿ts the decision to collude or not (and to report or not) would depend on the period where
we are. Furthermore, we assume that the evidence of collusion lasts for only one year which
implies that ￿rms cannot be ￿ned for past activity. The antitrust authority can impose a
maximal ￿ne F that is not enough to deter collusion given the probability of detection ￿
i.e. we assume that ￿ ￿ ￿F > 0. Moreover, the investigations that we consider are secret
investigations in the sense that ￿rms do not have the opportunity to apply for leniency after
the antitrust authority has opened an investigation.
The antitrust authorities also have in place a leniency program. Firms can report to the
antitrust authorities the existence of a collusive agreement. When one ￿rm reports then it
bene￿ts from a reduction q ￿ 0 on the ￿ne normally levied on it. We assume that a ￿ne
reduction is only available to the ￿rst informant and therefore when both ￿rms decide to
report simultaneously, they each have a chance of one half to be the ￿rst to report. Following
reporting, trust is broken and no further collusion could arise. From the next period onwards
the ￿rms revert to the static Nash equilibrium. We make this assumption in order to rule
out the rather unrealistic possibility that ￿rms collude and report in every period.10 Aubert
et al (2006), among others, argue that it is very unlikely that antitrust authorities would not
spot this kind of collusive behavior, and therefore they also exclude it from consideration.
Finally, the antitrust policy parameters are exogenously ￿xed in the beginning of the
game and are common knowledge to the ￿rms.
2.3.3 The timing of the game
In the ￿rst period of the game the timing is as follows:
Stage 1. The two ￿rms simultaneously decide whether they want to enter into a collusive
agreement or not. Only if both ￿rms decide to collude then the cartel is formed, otherwise,
competition takes place. In this latter case each ￿rm gets zero pro￿ts and the game ends for
this period.
Stage 2. If a cartel is formed in stage 1, each ￿rm decides whether it wants to stick to the
colluding agreement or to deviate in the product market and earn a payo⁄ of 2￿: If at least
one ￿rm deviates, collusion can not arise anymore; otherwise, each ￿rm gets the collusive
pro￿ts. Then market realisation occurs.
9More speci￿cally, EC has moved towards a setting that the level of ￿nes re￿ ects the turnover of the
companies in question (% of the ￿rm￿ s relevant turnover).
10Or to report once, collude and never report afterwards in a setting where no leniency for repeated
o⁄enders is o⁄ered, see Chen and Rey (2007).
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Stage 3. Nature draws the state of the economy. With probability ￿ the pro￿ts will be
stable forever (￿ = 1) and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ the market will shrink by ￿ < 1 in each
period.
Stage 4. Firms decide whether they want to report the infringement to the antitrust
authorities. The antitrust authority detects cartels with probability ￿ (a collusive agreement
that has not survived stage 2 cannot be detected). When the cartel is detected, or reported,
￿rms are charged with the corresponding ￿ne. Firms still earn the collusive payo⁄s for this
period.11 However, from the next period they return to the one stage Nash equilibrium.12
From period 2 onwards the game is repeated with no uncertainty on the pro￿t realisation.
Note that in our model, we assume that ￿rms obtain the colluding outcome even if they
decide to report in the same period. More speci￿cally, following Chen and Rey (2007), the
market realisation takes place before the antitrust authorities intervene in the market. This
assumption to some extent re￿ ects the requirement of the European Commission for leniency
applicants not to terminate their role in the illegal activity immediately (so as to be able to
make dawn raids in the conspirators￿premises that would yield some evidence).
2.4 Perfect Information: a benchmark scenario
We ￿rst consider the scenario of perfect information i.e. when the ￿rms know the state
of the economy. This scenario will be the building block for the whole game since in the
subgames that start from period 2 onwards there is perfect information.
One notices that under perfect information if a ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to report in the
second period of the game it would also be optimal to report in the ￿rst period. This
happens because the environment does not change and therefore the same considerations
will take place in each period. Therefore, similar to Motta and Polo (2003), we shall focus
on two relevant collusive strategies: one is to collude and report in the ￿rst period (CR) and
the second is to collude and never reveal (CNR).
Note that the present discounted value of colluding and not reporting, V cnr; is:
V
cnr = ￿ ￿ ￿F + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿(￿ ￿ ￿F) + ::: = (￿ ￿ ￿F)(1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + :::) =
(￿ ￿ ￿F)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
11Following Chen and Rey (2007), the market realisation takes place before the antitrust authorities inter-
vene in the market. This assumption to some extent re￿ ects the requirement of the European Commission
for leniency applicants not to terminate their role in the illegal activity immediately (so as to be able to
make dawn raids in the conspirators￿premises that would yield some evidence).
12This can be modeled explicitly by assuming for example perfect monitoring in the markets where an
infringement has been detected, or immense ￿nes for repeat o⁄enders. Note that the EC new Guidelines on
￿nes (2006) have a tougher stance against repeat o⁄enders
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whereas the present discount value of colluding and then reporting, V cr; is:
V




We solve the game using the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium solution concept. Pro-
ceeding with backward induction we need to consider two subgames.
2.4.1 The revelation subgame
First, we consider the reporting decision. When ￿rms have entered into a collusive
agreement one can depict the game in the following reduced13 normal form game
report no report
report ￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2)F;￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2)F ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F;￿ ￿ F





One can easily verify that the pair (report, report), in which the ￿rms decide to reveal
their illegal activity to the antitrust authorities is always a Nash Equilibrium. When leniency
is relatively small, with ￿ ￿ (1￿q)F; the pair (no report, no report) also always constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. When ￿ > (1 ￿ q)F the pair (no report, no report) is also a Nash
Equilibrium if:
(￿ ￿ ￿F)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F
() ￿ ￿
F(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q))
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F)
￿ ￿1 (2.1)
One notes that the higher the leniency o⁄ered the more fragile the cartel agreement is
made since ￿rms would have stronger incentives to report.14
When the pair (no report, no report) constitutes an equilibrium then it is also Pareto
dominant, i.e. both ￿rms will prefer to remain silent than to run into the antitrust authorities￿
leniency program. We shall assume throughout the paper, as in Motta and Polo (2003), that
when there is a Pareto Dominating equilibrium ￿rms would be able to coordinate on it.
13We assume that the continuation game of (no report, no report) is to collude and never report forever
and therefore we introduce the present discounted value of collude and never report in the (no report, no
report) outcome.
14More speci￿cally, the ￿rst derivative of ￿1 with respect to q can be shown to be always positive and
therefore for a higher level of leniency the threshold of the discount factor for sustaining collusion increases.
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2.4.2 The Cartel Formation subgame
Now moving backwards we have to examine the Cartel Formation subgame, i.e. whether
the ￿rms have an incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement in the product market.
When ￿ ￿ ￿1:
In this case the ￿rms prefer not to report:15 The present discounted value of colluding
(and not reporting) is V cnr; and the relevant product market deviation is that ￿rms undercut
each other and obtain the whole market: V d = 2￿:









Note that the critical discount factor value, ￿2, is inversely related to the size of the
shock, ￿. Collusion becomes more likely as ￿ ! 1: On the other hand, collusion is less likely
to be sustainable for small values of ￿ i.e. when the fall in the pro￿ts in every period is more
severe. When the future of the economy is grim, there is a greater incentive to deviate on
the relatively large collusion pro￿ts enjoyed in the current period.
Therefore, a necessary condition for ￿rms colluding and never reporting is that ￿ ￿
max(￿1;￿2) since both conditions (2.1) and (2.2) need to be satis￿ed.
When ￿ < ￿1:
In this case ￿rms prefer to report in the revelation game. In the Cartel Formation sub-
game ￿rms prefer to collude when the present discount value of colluding and then reporting,
V cr; is greater than the product market deviation, V d:
V
cr = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2









For ￿rms to have an incentive to enter a collusive agreement and then report, it has to
be that the leniency that the antitrust authoritiy o⁄ers is much greater than 1 i.e. when it
o⁄ers rewards. This is the case of "exploitative" leniency policy: the leniency policy is so
attractive that it induces ￿rms to collude in order to take advantage of its rewards. Note
15As long as ￿ > (1 ￿ q)F. Otherwise for any discount rate the ￿rms would prefer not to report in the
revelation subgame.
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that this condition does not depend on the discount rate since once reporting takes place
￿rms cannot collude any longer and all the future payo⁄s are zero.
Lemma 2.1 The introduction of a leniency policy under perfect information when no re-
wards are allowed is completely ine⁄ective i.e. it does not a⁄ect the rate of cartel formation
nor the cartel desistance. Firms will prefer to collude when ￿ ￿ ￿2:
Proof: To assess the e⁄ectiveness of the leniency program we have to compare the case
where q = 0 with the case where q 2 (0;1]. When no leniency program is adopted, i.e. q = 0,
￿rms have no bene￿t from reporting. On the other hand, reporting brings costs to the ￿rms
since they would have to pay the ￿ne with certainty and not only the expected ￿ne. As we
have shown above even when q 2 (0;1]; as long as no rewards are o⁄ered, reporting cannot
arise as an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, leniency does not enhance desistance. Further,





F(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q))
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F)
= ￿1 =)












=) 0 > ￿ ￿ ￿F
i.e. that each period￿ s expected pro￿ts when colluding are negative, which by assumption
cannot occur.
This implies that introducing leniency is irrelevant in the ex ante decision of the ￿rms
to enter a collusive agreement or not. We still require that ￿ ￿ ￿2. Therefore, leniency also
has no e⁄ect on deterring collusion.
This result should come at no surprise since ￿rms have exactly the same information
before reporting as in the cartel formation subgame. Firms would have no incentive to
report unless leniency o⁄ers rewards, and therefore their ex ante decision to enter a cartel
agreement would not be a⁄ected. Firms simply collude when the product market deviation
is not pro￿table.
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2.5 Imperfect Information Scenario
The interesting result of the above analysis is that under perfect information the ￿rms
will collude and report only when there is a very large reward. Therefore, in the equilibrium
with no rewards there would be no applications for leniency. This seems to contradict what
actually happens in practice. This is precisely the puzzle that we are trying to understand
and analyse why do ￿rms apply for leniency. We present a model where the collapse of
collusion would provide the incentive to the ￿rms to report their illegal activity. We intro-
duce "imperfect" information16 by allowing for the sequence of pro￿ts in the market to be
uncertain at time t = 1. We assume that with probability 1￿￿ a negative shock will hit this
sector of the economy in every period (bad state of economy), i.e. ￿ < 1. With probability
￿ pro￿ts will be stable forever (good state) i.e. ￿ = 1. Note that the results hold for any two
values of ￿ as long as they are not identical.17 Remember that from period 2 onwards there
is no uncertainty on the pro￿t realisation. In what follows we shall assume that there are
no rewards to leniency applicants, as is currently the case in the vast majority of antitrust
policies in the world.
To solve this game we need to consider ￿rst the subgames that start in the second
period. Since uncertainty is thereafter dissolved, the conditions we obtained under perfect
information hold. We have to consider three cases concerning the optimal strategy of the
￿rms starting from period 2. This happens because the incentive compatibility constraint in
the product market is more easily satis￿ed when we are in the good state of the economy.
Recall from equation (2.2) that ￿2 is an decreasing function of ￿ and therefore when ￿ = 1
the condition is satis￿ed for a greater range of values of the discount factor. We obtain two
rather trivial cases and one more interesting:
If ￿ < ￿2;￿=1.
In this scenario ￿rms will never collude in the perfect information scenario regardless of
the state of the economy. Therefore, since from period 2 onwards ￿rms will prefer not to
collude, the only Nash Equilibrium is to also not collude in the ￿rst period of the game.
If ￿ ￿ ￿2;￿<1.
In this case we already know that ￿rms will always collude from period 2 onwards. It
comes as no surprise that also in the ￿rst period the ￿rms prefer to collude.18 Note that for
16Technically, we introduce uncertainty (and not imperfect information) in the ￿rst period of the game.
If, however, Nature chooses in the ￿rst stage of period 1 and the ￿rms observe this only in stage 4, then
our game is an imperfect information game. Otherwise, we have perfect information with 3 players (the two
￿rms and Nature).
17The main results also hold for positive values of ￿:
18Now the relevant deviation is whether:
￿(
(￿￿￿F)
1￿(1￿￿)￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(
(￿￿￿F)
1￿￿(1￿￿)￿) ￿ 2￿ =)
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a = 0 or a = 1 we obtain the corresponding perfect information cases.
If ￿ 2 [￿2;￿=1;￿2;￿<1).
This is the interesting case. Here collusion would only be optimal from period 2 onwards
as long as the high state of the economy has occurred. On the other hand, when the bad
state occurs, ￿rms prefer to compete since they cannot credibly commit not to deviate in the
product market. On what follows we assume that the discount factor falls in this range. We
also make the assumption that ￿rms cannot have strategies of the type "wait and see". Firms
have to decide today whether they want to take part in the illegal activity; they would not
have this possibility tomorrow unless they decide to collude today. We now move backwards
into the ￿rst period of the game.
2.5.1 The revelation subgame
We ￿rst analyse the two Revelation Subgames in the ￿rst period:
When ￿ = 1 (good state occurs) :
the normal form game would be written exactly as in the full information game with
￿ = 1 since the continuation value of all actions is unaltered. Therefore the pair (no report,
no report) is the Pareto dominating equilibrium (since also ￿ ￿ ￿2;￿=1):
When ￿ < 1 (bad state occurs) :
Since ￿rms from period 2 onwards will prefer to compete rather than collude, the reduced
normal form of the reporting game is:
report no report
report ￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2)F;￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2)F ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F;￿ ￿ F
no report ￿ ￿ F;￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F ￿ ￿ ￿F;￿ ￿ ￿F
As long as:
￿ ￿ ￿F < ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)F ) ￿ > 1 ￿ q
the only equilibrium is for both ￿rms to report; otherwise, when ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ q; the pair (no
report, no report) is the Pareto dominating equilibrium.
Therefore, we have shown that reporting can indeed be triggered when the bad state of
the economy occurs. For example, if there is immunity, q = 1, then ￿rms prefer to report








1￿(1￿￿)￿￿ ￿ 2￿ which holds given that we consider the case where
￿ ￿ ￿L1:
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generous, it becomes more likely that ￿rms would prefer to report. Essentially, ￿rms ￿nd
it optimal to report since the leniency program might o⁄er a protection from ￿nes. When
￿ > 1￿q the outcome (no report, no report) cannot be an equilibrium since ￿rms can increase
their pro￿ts by deviating and reporting. Instead, when ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ q ￿rms ￿nd it optimal not
to report. This happens since the probability of detection is relatively small with respect to
the post leniency ￿ne and therefore the leniency program does not o⁄er e⁄ective protection
from ￿nes.
Lemma 2.2 (The ex post e⁄ect of leniency) When there is no leniency program there
is no desistance. The introduction of a leniency policy when there is uncertainty about the
future pro￿tability can lead to desistance when the bad state of the economy occurs, as long
as ￿ > 1 ￿ q:
Proof: As shown above a necessary condition for reporting to arise in equilibrium is
that ￿ > 1 ￿ q: However, when q = 0 this inequality cannot be satis￿ed. When no leniency
program is available, once again the revelation subgame is trivial. Firms would never have
an incentive to report since this would imply they have to pay the ￿ne with certainty.
Firms compare the probability of detection and the proportion of ￿ne they still have to
pay if they apply for leniency. Recall that the cartel activity is going to collapse from T = 2
onwards in any case.when the bad state of the economy materialises. If ￿ > 1￿q ￿rms prefer
to apply for leniency to get protection from ￿nes since otherwise they would have to pay a
higher expected ￿ne.
2.5.2 The cartel formation subgame
The question that follows is whether collusion arises ex ante. We therefore focus on the
Cartel Formation subgame. We distinguish between two subcases, following Lemma 2.2.
When ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ q ￿rms prefer to not report in the revelation subgame.






1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿F) ￿ 2￿ (2.3)
) ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿F
(￿ + ￿F + a(￿ ￿ ￿F))(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿cnr
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One notes that the critical discount rate is always greater than under the case of constant
pro￿ts and perfect information i.e. ￿cnr ￿ ￿2;￿=1:19 This implies that under this scenario
collusion is less likely, which is not surprising given that with probability 1 ￿ ￿ collusion
would not be an optimal choice from the second period onwards. Also, when a = 1; i.e.
when the high state occurs with certainty, ￿cnr = ￿2;￿=1:
Furthermore, as shown in Lemma 2.2, when there is no leniency program ￿rms do not
report. Therefore, equation (2.3) is the Incentive Constraint (IC) of ￿rms joining collusive
agreements in such a case. Naturally, for the leniency policy to possibly have a (positive)
e⁄ect on deterrence the leniency should be su¢ ciently high to make the incentives to report
worthwhile.
When ￿ > 1 ￿ q ￿rms prefer to report in the revelation subgame.





1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2
)F) ￿ 2￿ (2.4)
) ￿ ￿
￿ + F(￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿
q
2))




Proposition 2.1 (The ex ante e⁄ects of leniency) The introduction of a leniency pol-
icy when there is uncertainty about future pro￿tability a⁄ects the ex ante decision of ￿rms to
engage in collusion when ￿ > 1 ￿ q. Greater deterrence is achieved when 1 ￿ q < ￿ < 1 ￿
q
2:
Proof: One should compare the case where there is leniency policy to the case where
there is no leniency program. Remember that when q = 0 equation (2.3) represents the














)F) ￿ 2￿ )




From Lemma 2.1 we know that reporting can arise only when ￿ > 1 ￿ q:20 Therefore
deterrence is enhanced when






2￿(1￿￿) ) (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿F) ￿ 0 which always holds.
20It is trivial to note that when ￿ = 1 ￿ q then the introduction of leniency makes no di⁄erence on the ex
ante incentive to engage in the collusive activity.
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In this range of values for ￿ the goal of the leniency program to place ￿rms at a Prisoner￿ s
dilemma situation is achieved. More precisely, even if the ￿rms would collectively prefer the
outcome of (no report, no report), the possibility o⁄ered by the leniency program to report
makes deviations from this outcome pro￿table. Given that ￿ > 1￿q; the pair (no report, no
report) cannot be an equilibrium and the only Nash Equilibrium of the game is to (report,
report). However, at equilibrium ￿rms share the reduction in the ￿ne and when ￿ < 1￿
q
2 they
become worse o⁄. Anticipating this, in the presence of a leniency program ￿rms will be less
willing to enter illegal activities than in the case where there was no leniency policy. When
the leniency program protects "adequately" the ￿rms that report from ￿nes (i.e. o⁄er them
lower expected ￿nes but not rewards) then leniency can enhance deterrence and destabilise
the cartel.
Lemma 2.3 The introduction of a leniency policy can not decrease deterrence.
Proof: We observe that condition (2.3) is stricter than condition (2.4) and therefore ex









We need to show that (2.6) cannot be satis￿ed.













Therefore, only for small detection rates ￿rms will be able to sustain collusion in the good
state of the economy. The upper bound of ￿ where collusion can be sustained is obtained
for F = 0, when ￿ = 1
2. However, condition (2.6) can never be satis￿ed for such an ￿; unless
rewards are o⁄ered, i.e. for q > 1.
This result is di⁄erent from the result obtained in Motta and Polo (2003) and underlines
the positive e⁄ect of the leniency program in our setup. In most papers on leniency there
is a trade o⁄ between higher desistance (leniency makes reporting more attractive) and
lower deterrence (a decrease in the expected ￿ne makes collusion more attractive ex ante).
However, in our setup ￿rms know with certainty whether the cartel they participate into is
going to fail or not from period 2 onwards when they base their decision to report to the
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antitrust authorities. Therefore, the only e⁄ect working is a protection from ￿nes e⁄ect that
leads to a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma situation and makes ￿rms less willing to enter collusion ex
ante. The introduction of the leniency program cannot lead to a procollusive e⁄ect since
this would require that ￿rms would need to be better o⁄ in the presence of the program.
This in turn, would require the remaining part of the ￿ne still to be paid following a leniency
application, (1￿
q
2)F; to be higher than in the case of no reporting, ￿F. However, this cannot
occur since it implies that the probability of detection must be higher than one half; a level
at which collusion would not be sustainable in any case.
The ￿gure below illustrates the Incentive Compatibility Constraints for the ￿rms to
participate in the cartel activity in the plane (q;￿) for given values of ￿;F;￿; and ￿ (such
that it satis￿es ￿ 2 [￿2;￿=1;￿2;￿<1)): The line ICcnr represents the incentive constraint for the
case where there is no reporting at equilibrium. This is precisely the case if there is no
leniency program. Also, as long as ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ q (the area below the diagonal line), we have
shown that it is the optimal response of the ￿rms in the presence of a leniency program:
Unsurprisingly, this line does not depend on the leniency o⁄ered and is represented as a line
parallel to the q￿axis. Above the line ￿rms prefer to not collude whereas below the line they
prefer to collude (and not report).
The thick black lines, ICcr represents the IC in the case where there is a leniency program.
As we showed above this coincides with line ICcnr for ￿ ￿ 1￿q: When ￿ > 1￿q the ICcr is
an upwards sloping curve which indicates that ￿rms are more willing to collude and report as
leniency increases. In the area above the thick black lines (ICcr) ￿rms prefer not to engage
in the collusive activity whereas in the area that lies between the upwards sloping part of
ICcr and the ￿ = 1 ￿ q line they prefer to collude and report if the bad state occurs.
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Equilibrium solutions for: F = 1;￿ = 1; a = 0:5; ￿ = 0:9
The role of leniency can be understood from the ￿gure. We detect two areas where the
leniency policy changes the optimal response of the ￿rms. In the presence of a leniency
policy, in area (2) ￿rms report their activity to the antitrust authorities when the bad state
of the economy materialises. This is not unambiguously a positive e⁄ect since these cartels
would fail in any case from period 2 onwards. Furthermore, remember that given the timing of
the game the market realisation for this period has already occurred and therefore consumers
have already paid the collusive prices. However, one notes that ￿rms would collectively prefer
to not report in this area. The leniency program puts the ￿rms into a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
situation by o⁄ering protection from ￿nes. Anticipating this, ￿rms would be less likely to
collude ex ante. This give rise to the procompetitive e⁄ect of the leniency policy: area (1).
In area (1) ￿rms would ￿nd it optimal not to collude in the presence of a leniency program
whereas in its absence they would collude. Therefore, greater deterrence is achieved.
2.5.2.1 Comparative statics
We proceed with comparative static analysis. We ￿rst consider a decrease in the prob-
ability of the high state, ￿. Taking the derivative of conditions (2.3) and (2.4) with respect
to ￿ we observe that the value of collusion increases and therefore ￿rms are more willing
to engage in collusive activities in the ￿rst place. This is also illustrated in the graph in
Appendix 2.7.3.1 where now a = 0:3 instead of a = 0:5. This result is intuitive since when a
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is lower there is a greater probability that the low state of the economy will occur. Therefore,
it is less likely that ￿rms would prefer to collude in the ￿rst period. Also note that when we
set a = 1 then the ICcnr and ICcr coincide. Hence, one notes that the di⁄erence between
the vertical intercept of the two lines increases as ￿ decreases.
The second scenario we are going to consider is a change in the proportional ￿ne, F.
As expected, collusion becomes less likely when the proportional ￿ne increases. The e⁄ects
are very similar to the case where ￿ decreases. We observe a downward jump of the ICs.
This indicates that collusion is less likely to be sustainable given that the ￿ne that the ￿rms
are likely to pay increases. At the same time, the slope of the ICcr when reporting is the
preferred choice (slightly) increases. Given that the ￿ne is relatively larger the impact of an
increase in q is greater.
An increase in the discount factor makes collusion more likely since the future collusive
payo⁄s are relatively more important today. One notes that both ICs move upwards as
expected.
Finally, increasing the collusive pro￿ts shifts the ICs upwards. Trebling the pro￿ts
increases the incentives to enter collusive agreements. Note that the new ICcr is closer to
the ICcnr line and its slope is ￿ atter. This occurs since an increase in the leniency rate would
have a smaller e⁄ect on the incentive to collude when the collusive pro￿ts are greater.
2.5.2.2 Introducing a positive shock
Lemma 2.3 above predicts that there is no side e⁄ect of introducing a leniency program.
We would like to investigate whether this ￿nding is robust. We make a small modi￿cation
of the model. We suppose that in the good state of the economy instead of constant pro￿ts,
pro￿ts are increasing by fraction ￿ > 1 in each period.
Lemma 2.4 When ￿ > 4￿+F
4￿ in the good state of the economy, the introduction of a leniency
program may also have an anticompetitive e⁄ect:
Proof: We require that the lower bound of the discount factor is lower than 1:
(￿ + ￿F)
2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
< 1 ) ￿ <
￿(2￿ ￿ 1)
2￿ + F
= e ￿ (2.7)
Note that equation (2.7) now depends on ￿: Also from equations (2.3) and (2.4) ￿rms
would enjoy a higher payo⁄ under reporting than under no reporting (and deterrence would
decrease) when:
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2￿ + F ￿ 4￿￿ + 2￿
2￿ + F
This can only be satis￿ed when there are no rewards when:
2￿ + F ￿ 4￿￿ + 2￿
2￿ + F
< 0 ) ￿ >
4￿ + F
4￿





a third, perverse, e⁄ect arises. Since collusion would now be sustainable even for very high
probability of detection, it is possible that the ￿rms would prefer to report and enjoy the
reduction in the ￿ne o⁄ered by the leniency program. Essentially, such a leniency program
would overprotect the ￿rms from the ￿nes, and would render the revelation game into a
coordination problem where (report, report) is the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Therefore,
their expected pro￿ts increase and ex ante there is a higher probability that they enter in the
collusive activity. This possibility was not possible when ￿ = 1 since in this case collusion
would not be sustainable for values of the probability of detection higher than one half.
2.5.2.3 Allowing for "wait and see" strategy
Now we relax the assumption that ￿rms need to collude in period 1 if they wish to have
the possibility to collude at a later period. Therefore, we want to investigate whether ￿rms
prefer to not engage in the illegal activity until they know with certainty the state of the
demand. In this case ￿rms might employ a strategy of the type not collude in the ￿rst period
and only collude (and not report) from period 2 onwards, as long as the good state of the
economy materialises. Remember that since the uncertainty is resolved after the end of the
￿rst period, this strategy dominates the strategies of entering the collusive agreement, if the
good state occurs, at a later period.
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1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
We shall consider the ￿rms￿ s decision in the ￿rst period and whether allowing for a wait and
see strategy alters the equilibrium strategies. We analyse whether the equilibrium strategies
that we identi￿ed above are preferred to the "wait and see strategy" in the cartel formation
stage of the game.
When ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ q; the ￿rms decide not to report. The strategy collude and not report





1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿F) > V
ws = ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿F
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
) ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿F)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿F) > 0
which is always satis￿ed. This is intuitive since we are considering the case where it is
optimal not to report even if the low state of the economy arise; therefore, one would expect
that it would not be optimal to "wait and see".
When ￿ > 1 ￿ q; ￿rms in the reporting game decide to report. The present value when







1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿






1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
) ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿F
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
+ (1 ￿ a)(￿ ￿ (1 ￿
q
2
)F) ￿ 0 (2.8)
then allowing for such a strategy does not alter the equilibrium strategy of the ￿rms.
One notes that a su¢ cient condition for the wait and see strategy not to be part of the
equilibrium strategy is that ￿ ￿(1￿
q
2)F ￿ 0: Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the above




We have shown that leniency applications may be triggered when ￿rms realise that the
cartel in which they participate is failing. Therefore, in a context of imperfect information
when the bad state of the economy occurs, ￿rms will apply for leniency if the leniency
policy o⁄ers e⁄ective protection from the ￿nes. This places ￿rms into a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
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situation. However, this is not the only e⁄ect of the leniency policy. Indeed, anticipating that
there may be desistance later on, collusion may not be achieved ex ante. Not only desistance
but also deterrence is achieved.
Therefore, even in a context where leniency applications are triggered by a failing cartel
and ￿ ￿ 1, leniency programs are shown to be procompetitive. Antitrust authorities should
not worry about attracting only failing cartels. However, when rewards are o⁄ered reporting
gives the opportunity, to the industries where collusion would collapse anyhow (i.e. in
industries hit by the bad realisation of demand), to report and gain on leniency. Collusion
could be made more likely ex ante since the expected cost of entering a collusive agreement
decreases. Therefore, we suggest, contrary to Spagnolo (2004), that o⁄ering rewards might
be counterproductive and decrease deterrence.21
One should note that the main results of the model hold for all values of ￿.22 As long as
there are two possible states of nature where the pro￿t level are correlated in a persistent
way, ￿rms might run into the antitrust authorities when the bad state materialises. We
have shown that a third perverse e⁄ect could arise when ￿ > 4￿+F
4￿ in the good state of the
economy. In such a case, leniency policy might o⁄er ￿rms excessive protection from ￿nes
and make ￿rms more likely to collude ex ante. This scenario, however, is unlikely since
it supposes that the probability of detection is very large. Therefore, in cases where the
participation of ￿rms in cartel activity is extremely likely, antitrust authorities should not
o⁄er reduction in ￿nes.
Furthermore, and very importantly, one should not only focus on the speci￿c modelling
assumptions that we have made in the above analysis. The essential element is that ￿rms
know with certainty that from the next period on the cartel in which they participate is going
to collapse with certainty. Then the protection from ￿nes e⁄ect identi￿ed above would make
them worse o⁄ and make collusion less likely ex ante. The cartel activity might fall in the
second period for other reasons also; for example it could be that the antritrust authorities
can detect perfectly the existence of a cartel agreement in the second period with probability
￿ or that the ￿ne might increase substantially in the second period and so on.
A possible extension of our model would be to consider a more general set of strategies.
More speci￿cally, one might want to consider what happens when following a cartel detection
21A complete analysis of the game when rewards are possible is necessary though. This happens since
the continuation value of the game from period 2 onwards might change. Recall from Lemma 2.1 that the
ine⁄ectiveness of the leniency policy under perfect information only holds for q ￿ 1:
22However for cases where in the bad state of the economy ￿ ￿ 1
2 we cannot fall into the interesting range
of the discount rate: This happens since we require that
￿+￿F
2￿￿(1￿￿) < 1 ) ￿ <
￿(2￿￿1)
F+2￿￿ : Since ￿ 2 [0;1) we
require that 2￿ ￿ 1 > 0 ) ￿ > 1
2:
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(either through investigation or though reporting) there is an intensi￿ed scrutiny in the
industry for T periods (see Chen and Rey (2007)). This would allow ￿rms to collude once
again. Or, one could account for a more general set of punishment strategies.
Furthermore, one could generalise on the possible types of pro￿t shocks that the economy
could experience. One possibility that we have accounted for is that the pro￿t levels are not
correlated but demand could be high or low in each period (as in Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986)). However, in such a context no leniency applications occur at equilibrium. We will
try to introduce shocks in the pro￿ts that follow a Markov process and explore whether the
results we have obtained carry through.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Appendix 1 Average ￿ne






















































2.7.2 Appendix 2 Leniency Programs
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2.7.3 Appendix 3 Comparative Statics
2.7.3.1 Decreasing the probability of the high state, ￿
Equilibrium solutions for: F = 1, ￿ = 1; a = 0:3; ￿ = 0:9
2.7.3.2 Increasing the Fine, F
Equilibrium solutions for: F = 2, ￿ = 1; a = 0:5; ￿ = 0:9
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2.7.3.3 Increasing the Discount Factor, ￿
Equilibrium solutions for: F = 1, ￿ = 1; a = 0:5; ￿ = 0:96
2.7.3.4 Increasing the Collusive Pro￿ts, ￿
Equilibrium solutions for: F = 1, ￿ = 3; a = 0:5; ￿ = 0:9
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION ANTITRUST FINES AND
DRIVERS FOR APPEAL
3.1 Introduction
There has been an increasing unease in the European Competition Policy with the high
proportion of cases that are appealed following an infringement decision by the European
Commission ("Commission") in the ￿eld of antitrust. The great number of appeals implies
that a lot of resources of the European Commission Competition Directorate are engaged
into costly litigation in front of the European Courts instead of chasing new anticompetitive
practices. As Commissioner Kroes (2005) has noted: ￿one cartel decision triggers an average
of 3 to 4 court cases... defending our decisions is an ongoing and implicit part of the process
and needs to be planned for in terms of resources￿ .1
This paper investigates the motivation behind the ￿rms￿decision to appeal the ￿ning
decisions adopted by the Commission for infringing article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on
European Union ("article 101" and "article 102"). Why do ￿rms appeal so frequently and
doggedly against cartel decisions? How ￿rms￿propensity to appeal is a⁄ected by recent
policy developments in Commission￿ s ￿ning policy, and most notably by the introduction of
the ￿ning Guidelines and of the leniency policy? Do ￿rms resort to the European Courts
as a response to the higher ￿nes imposed over time? Is this behaviour due to cultural
norms and an evidence of ￿an adversarial/litigation culture￿ ? Are listed ￿rms more likely
to appeal? Does it depend on whether the Commission decision is an article 101 or on
article 102 decision? At the same time, we analyse the degree of success of these appeals in
terms of overturning Commission￿ s decisions and reducing the ￿nes imposed. We investigate
whether this depends on political variables such as the nationality of the ￿rms and how
policy parameters may have a⁄ected the success of these appeals.
Firms have been appealing for a number of underlying reasons, ranging from procedural
reasons to substantive legal and economic issues which have shaped several policy decisions
of the Commission.
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First, as Richardson (1999) argues, during the ￿rst three decades of European Commu-
nity Competition law, the Commission was criticised for the obfuscation surrounding how
it determines the level of the imposed ￿nes. In the last years, the Commission has made
a concerted e⁄ort to curb the uncertainty surrounding the ￿ning procedure. In 1998, she
published Guidelines on the calculation of ￿nes ("the 1998 Guidelines").2 The rationale was
to enhance the transparency on the determination of the level of the ￿nes and reduce uncer-
tainty. The Commission hoped that the 1998 Guidelines would reduce the litigation costs by
laying down a number of factors for constructing the ￿nal amount of the ￿ne. Prior to 1998,
￿it was readily apparent that very few decision imposing large ￿nes escaped a challenge be-
fore the courts￿ .3 However, several authors note that a steady number of ￿rms continued to
resort to litigation. For example, Geradin and Henry (2005) argue that the 1998 Guidelines
did not manage to improve the certainty and that "laconic conclusions by the Commission
will only give impetus to increased litigation before the Courts". Carree at al (2008) claim
that the increased appeals rate following the 1998 Guidelines, indicate regulatory failure with
high legal costs. On the other hand, the need for higher transparency has been put in ques-
tion even by Commissioner Kroes (2005). In her 100 days in o¢ ce speech she said regarding
the 1998 Guidelines: "In my view the guidelines are well done and have been endorsed by the
Court of First Instance ("CFI"). I know they are criticised in some other quarters for lacking
su¢ cient transparency. I take this allegation seriously; however, I have to say that I do not
agree. I cannot see how allowing potential infringers to calculate the likely cost/bene￿t ratio
of a cartel in advance will somehow contribute to a sustained policy of deterrence and zero
tolerance."4 Stephan (2007) argues that "the way the Commission determines ￿nes is not a
precise science, and the scope for appeals reducing those ￿nes will exist for as long as the
Commission exercises independently its wide discretion in their calculation. The rise in the
number of cartel cases naturally entails a concomitant growth in the annual number of legal
challenges". In June 2006 the European Commission adopted new ￿ning Guidelines for com-
panies found guilty of infringing Articles 101 or 102 ("the 2006 Guidelines"). Commissioner
Kroes (2006) stated that "after more than eight years of experience, it is useful to re￿ne the
rules in the light of experience".5 Motta (2008) suggests that "to the extent that the Courts
2Guidelines on the method of setting ￿nes imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 and
Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty ￿nes (1998)
3Geradin and Henry (2005)
4Kroes, N. (2005), "The ￿rst hundred days", speech available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/205&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
5Kroes, N. (2006), "Commission revises Guidelines for setting ￿nes in antitrust cases", available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/857&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
Magos, Dimitrios (2011), Three Essays in Competition Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/259513.1. INTRODUCTION 85
will accept the new ￿ning policy of the Commission, this may have the e⁄ect of making
litigation less likely, freeing precious personnel time of the Commission."
From a policy perspective, the Commission has played a paramount role in antitrust
policy in the European system. It is the investigator, the prosecutor and the sentencer,
unlike the US system. This has raised criticisms on the constitutional notions of due process
and separation of powers (see Harting and Gibbs (2005)). Therefore, one could expect that
there would be a high propensity for the ￿rms to contest the facts and the reasoning of the
Commission and appeal, especially since ￿nes have increased exponentially over time. On the
other hand, one could claim that the judicial review in the European system - and the high
appeal rate - is highly needed and counterbalances this lack of separation of powers. As the
level of ￿nes has increased over time, there has been a stronger need to strengthen the legal
basis of the sanctioning power and to create a "more transparent decision making process
on the determination of the amount" (Camilli (2006)). The Commission acknowledged the
need for more transparency through the 1998 and 2006 Guidelines. In this perspective "an
economic analysis of the sanctioning policy does not carry out a mere advisory role, but
may provide an important tool in reviewing the consistency of the high ￿nes imposed for the
infringement." (Camilli (2006)).
The appeal rate is also likely to be a⁄ected by the type of infringement (see also the
section on the legal framework below). Appellants often claim that the evidence that the
Commission holds is insu¢ cient. Especially in cartel cases, which represent an overwhelming
majority of the ￿nes imposed by the Commission in the last decade, there is a high standard
of proof, that of beyond reasonable doubt. Without the discovery of an explicit agreement
the establishment of guilt can become very di¢ cult. In response to this challenge, in 1996 the
Commission also introduced a leniency program for cartel activities.6 Under this program a
member of the cartel that would inform the Commission of the existence of the illegal agree-
ment and/or provide important information would receive a reduction in the ￿ne imposed
on it. The greatest advantage of the leniency program is that it brings crucial evidence
to the antitrust authorities and can therefore greatly facilitate this information gathering.
The program was revised in 2002 amidst concerns that it did not create su¢ cient incentives
for the ￿rms to ￿race to the Commission￿ .7,8 The leniency program might have helped the
Commission over the information gathering, however, critics claim that the Commission held
a large discretion over the reduction of the ￿nes that it would allocate, and therefore did
6Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of ￿nes in cartel cases (1996).
7This happened since the initial program did not provide immunity to the ￿rst informant once the
Commission had opened an investigation (see Motta and Polo (2003)).
8Commission Notice on Immunity from ￿nes and reduction of ￿nes in cartel cases (2006)
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not address the obfuscation of the ￿ne setting procedure. Geradin and Henry (2005) suggest
that even the revised lenciency policy leaves room for subjective decisions and therefore for
litigation. 9
Furthermore, until the end of 2007 the European Courts had never increased the ￿ne of
the appellant ￿rms, even if they are entitled to.10 Even after the 1998 Guidelines, Camilli
(2006) notes that "the CFI self-limited its reviewing powers for the application of the Guide-
lines principles within the proportionality principle. This has meant that the CFI has never
been able to increase a ￿ne imposed by the Commission". As a result, ￿rms do not perceive
that they run at risk of ending up with a higher ￿ne by appealing at the European Courts.
Furthermore, Montag (1996) argues that the high proportion of successful appeals in the
1980s and 1990s provided an incentive to ￿rms to appeal. Thanks to the more transparent
criteria set in the 2006 Guidelines, Camilli (2006) considers that "the Court could have more
grounds to redress the Commission ￿ning power, eventually raising the original amount".
For the ￿rst time on December 2007 the CFI increased a ￿ne imposed by the Commission
for a violation of the European Union￿ s competition laws (for BASF￿ s participation in the
Choline Chloride cartel).11
Another variable that might in￿ uence the decision of a ￿rm to appeal might be the legal
tradition in the country of the ￿rm in question (see Cassey (2005) who study the impact
of legal traditions into di⁄erent aspects of competition policy). For example, ￿rms from
countries with a common law legal tradition may be more willing to appeal Commission
decisions given that litigation is more important than in civil law tradition (importance of
precedence and appeal). Moreover, it is often claimed that corporate structure would have an
e⁄ect in the decision of ￿rms to appeal or not. Large ￿rms have in their possession ￿nancial
resources and access to legal advice and as a result their propensity to appeal would appear
to be greater. Or, it could be harder to admit to shareholders that the ￿rm had engaged in
an antitrust o⁄ense.
The second issue we investigate is the determinants of the success of the appeals. Montag
(1996) claims that the high proportion of successful appeals leads to a ￿crisis in cartel
9Another related policy development is the launch in July 2008 of a settlement procedure for cartel in-
vestigations aimed at speeding up the process and avoid costly litigation. However, the ￿rms when they
sign the settlement agreement they do not make a binding commitment not to resort to the European
Courts. The settlement procedure does not a⁄ect our sample since the ￿rst "hybrid" settlement case
was adopted in July 2010 and therefore the settlement procedure is not further discussed in the paper
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/985&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
10According to art 31 of Regulation 1/2003 ￿the Court shall have unlimited jurisdiction...; it may cancel,
reduce or increase the ￿ne or periodic penalty imposed￿
11Case COMP/37.533 ￿ Choline Chloride (2004) was decided following the 1998 Guidelines.
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infringement procedure￿ . He also argues that this results in a legally discredited system.
On the other hand, Harding and Gibbs (2005) argue that during the last decade the CFI
increasingly checks whether the Commission has correctly applied the leniency program and
the Guidelines and very rarely contradicts the principles of the Commission ￿ning decisions.
Geradin and Henry (2006) provide a detailed analysis of the parameters taken into account by
the CFI when reviewing the ￿nes imposed by the Commission. They ￿nd that the incorrect
application of the leniency policy is the most common reason for a reduction in the ￿ne
following the promulgation of the 1998 Guidelines.
More generally, Harding and Gibbs (2005) argue that there is a gradual change in the role
of the CFI. The CFI was originally a guarantor of regulatory rigour and fair dealing; however
its main function today at least for cartel infringement decisions is that of a sentencing
moderator. Besides, it has become rare that the Commission is defeated on major issues of
legal principle (see Harding and Gibbs (2005)).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second part we present the relevant legal
background and literature. In the third part we provide an empirical analysis of Commission
decisions in the period 1957-2009. We analyse the motivation behind the decision of ￿rms
to appeal against the Commission decision at the European Courts and we investigate the
determinants of the degree of success of these appeals. We focus on i) the e⁄ect of ￿rm
speci￿c characteristics (whether it is listed in the stock market, country of origin), ii) case
speci￿c characteristics (article 101 versus article 102, number of recitals in the case, number
of ￿rms in the case) and iii) policy changes (￿ning Guidelines, leniency program) using binary
and multinomial regressions. A main objective of this paper is to assess the e⁄ectiveness of
the ￿ning Guidelines in providing greater transparency in the ￿ning policy of the European
Commission.
3.2 Legal Framework and Related Literature
3.2.1 Legal Framework
The article focuses on infringement decisions of articles 101 and 102 of the TEU (ex
articles 85, 86 of Treaty of Rome and 81, 82 of Treaty of Nice). Article 101 prohibits the
agreements and concerted practices among undertakings that a⁄ect trade between Member
States as well as restricting competition within the common market. This includes several
types of economic conduct, such as horizontal or vertical agreements and joint ventures.
Cartel proceedings fall into the category of horizontal agreements. Article 102 prohibits
Magos, Dimitrios (2011), Three Essays in Competition Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/259513.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED LITERATURE 88
the abuse of dominant position of a company which includes exploitative practices (exces-
sive pricing) and exclusionary practices (such as price squeeze, exclusive dealing, predation,
trying).
Concerning the ￿ning policy, before the 1998 Guidelines, the Commission did not adopt
a unique approach, since the criteria followed were not predetermined, but explained in the
decision text case by case. Following the 1998 Guidelines the basic ￿ne was set directly for
each undertaking with reference to the gravity (minor, serious, very serious) and the duration
of the infringement. However, the gravity was not explicitly linked to a quantitative measure
of the e⁄ect of the infringements (as in the US Sentencing Guidelines); in fact a qualitative
criterion was claimed to be the most important element. Therefore, the 1998 Guidelines did
not provide any clear element to link the basic ￿ne with the infringement, "except the generic
evaluation of the seriousness of the illicit behavior". Indeed the basic amount was adjusted
to "take account of the e⁄ective economic capacity of o⁄enders to cause signi￿cant damage
to other operators, in particular consumers, and to set the ￿ne at a level which ensures that
it has a su¢ ciently deterrent e⁄ect". As a result, in practice "sometimes the ￿ne was estab-
lished with reference to the share in the European relevant market, other times with regard
to the size of the undertaking." (Camilli (2006)). Geradin and Henry (2005) note that even
di⁄erent basic amounts were given for the same anti-competitive infringements. Further-
more, the basic amount could be increased/reduced following aggravating and attenuating
circumstances. However, this was a non exhaustive list and their e⁄ect on the ￿ne was not
predetermined. Geradin and Henry (2006) conclude that "the Commission￿ s methodology
in calculating the ￿ne fails to solve the problems identi￿ed before 1998".
The 2006 Guidelines aimed to address the shortcomings of the previous system. The 2006
Guidelines￿main characteristic is the prevalence of the quantitative criterion in de￿ning the
base ￿ne. The Commission will "take the value of the undertaking￿ s sales of goods and
services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic
area within the EEA".12 The basic ￿ne is set by determining an initial value related to
a proportion of the value of sales to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates
(upper limit of 30%) and multiplying this with the number of years of the infringement and
adding a ￿xed component of 15-25% of the turnover of the undertaking. The basic ￿ne is
then adjusted to take into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the leniency
notice and ability to pay. The ￿ne cannot exceed 10% of the previous year￿ s total turnover
of the ￿rm.
12Guidelines on the method of setting ￿nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No
1/2003.(2006) O¢ cial Journal C 210, p. 2-5.
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3.2.2 Related literature
There is a series of articles that examines the antitrust ￿ning decisions of the Commission.
Veljanovski (2007) reviews decisions on ￿nes imposed by the Commission on cartels over the
ten year period 1998-2007. He ￿nds that ￿nes were appealed in 90% of the cartels detected
by one or more ￿rms and in total 98% of all ￿nes over the period (in monetary terms) were
contested in the courts. Also, he ￿nds that the European courts have reduced the ￿ne by an
average of approximately 19%.
Geradin and Henry (2005) perform a qualitative analysis of the judicial review following
the 1998 Guidelines. They ￿nd that litigation regarding the level of ￿nes in the European
courts "has not decreased, but seems on the contrary to have increased." They ￿nd that
the main ground of appeal is to obtain a reduction of the ￿ne imposed by the Commission,
rather than questioning that the ￿rm has been wrongly convicted.
Carree et al (2008) and (2010) present an analysis closer to the one undertaken in this
paper. They analyse antitrust Commission decisions in the period 1957-2004. They ￿nd
that a signi￿cant number of decisions has been appealed and the average reduction in the
￿ne awarded by European Courts was approximately 50%. They ￿nd that the higher the
level of ￿ne the higher the probability of appeal. Also, article 102 decisions are more likely
to be appealed. On the other hand, political or sectoral parameters do not appear to a⁄ect
the appeal decision of the ￿rms. In this paper we focus on the e⁄ect of policy parameters
and most speci￿cally of the Guidelines on the appeal decision of the ￿rms, which was not
investigated in these papers. Furthermore, we analyse the determinants of appeal outcome
in terms of the aforementioned e⁄ects. In terms of methodology, we adopt a similar binary
model analysis, however, clustering of observations by case is further undertaken. Also, the
period under consideration is more extended (includes cases up to 2009) which allows the
analysis of the decision of ￿rms to appeal Commission decisions following both the 1998 and
2006 Commission Guidelines.
Furthermore, there is a strand of the empirical literature that examines the political
economy dimension of the antitrust decisions. Duso et al (2007) ￿nd econometric evidence
that there are institutional and political environment factors that could a⁄ect the result of
a merger decision adopted by the European Commission. On the other hand, Ghosal and
Gallo (2001) ￿nd that in the US political variables do not a⁄ect the number of antitrust
cases that the Department of Justice initiated.
Bergmanm et al (2005) perform an analysis of the European Commission￿ s merger deci-
sions. Using a logit analysis they conclude that the Commission￿ s authorisation decision is
a⁄ected by the market shares of the merging parties as well as the entry barriers but not by
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political aspects. Lauk (2003) estimates the individual probability of an adverse ￿nding by
the German antitrust authority. She ￿nds that the market structure plays an important role
as the larger ￿rms on the market face an increased probability of an adverse ￿nding. Also,
the higher the concentration in the market and the greater the entry barriers are the more
likely the competition authority is to ￿nd certain market behaviour to be anticompetitive.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Data and descriptive Statistics
The dataset was constructed by consistently collecting publicly available information
from the infringement decisions of the Directorate General for Competition published in
the O¢ cial Journal of the European Communities and the decisions of the Court of First
Instance ("CFI") and European Court of Justice ("ECJ") (available at www.curia.eu).
In the current analysis all the ￿ning decisions of the Commission in the ￿eld of antitrust
have been examined from 1957 to 2009.
There are 994 observations i.e. ￿rms to which a Commission infringement decision
with ￿nes is addressed to, in the ￿eld of antitrust. In the early years of enforcement, the
Commission took only a few infringement decisions with a ￿ne. In July 1969 the ￿rst two
such decisions were adopted (Quinine and Colourants) and 16 undertakings were ￿ned. The
highest number of undertakings that was ￿ned in a given year was in 1994 (93) while a great
number of ￿rms was ￿ned in 1992 (57), 2001 (60), and in 1977 and 1984 (55).
There have been in total 191 cases. The greatest number of cases were adopted in 2001
(15 cases) while 10 cases were adopted in 1998, 2002 and 2007.
The BMW dealers￿case (48 undertakings in 1977) and the Cement case (44 undertakings
in 1994) are the cases with the greatest number of undertakings that was ￿ned.
Fines Fines represent the principal tool of antitrust enforcement in the EU given that the
Commission does not possess the jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties.13 Furthermore,
private damage claims have not yet gained signi￿cance despite the White Paper on private
enforcement.14
There has been a very signi￿cant upwards trend in the ￿nes imposed by the Commission.
The graph below shows the (2007 in￿ ation adjusted) total ￿ne imposed on ￿rms. It can be
13Art 23(5) of Regulation 1/2203 states that the Decisions should not be of criminal law nature.
14White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008
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seen that the ￿nes have increased exponentially since the ￿rst case in 1969, reaching the
highest yearly level in 2007. The ￿rst peak can be observed in 1994 which is mainly due to
the high ￿nes imposed in the Cement cartel.15 The second peak is observed in 1998 (mainly
due to the ￿nes involved in the Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement16) and since 2001 ￿nes
have been consistently at high levels. The highest (nominal) ￿nes are Intel￿ s article 102 ￿ne in
2009 (EUR 1060 million),17 St Gobain￿ s ￿ne in 2008 (EUR 896 million) for its participation
in the Carglass cartel,18 Microsoft￿ s article 102 ￿nes in 2008 (EUR 889 million)19 and 2004
(EUR 497 million),20 the ￿nes imposed on Eon and GDF Suez in 2009 for market sharing
agreement (EUR 553 million each)21 and the ￿ne imposed on ThyssenKrupp in 2007 for its
participation in the Elevators and Escalators cartel (EUR 480 million).22




































































































All top 10 cartel ￿nes given by the Commission are after 2001.
Number of Appeals It is common that not all cartel participants appeal the Commission
decisionm even if they are addressees of the same decision. In particular, out of the 994
15Case IV/33.126, IV/33.322 (1994)
16Case IV/35.134 (1998)




21Case COMP/ 39.401 (2009)
22Case COMP/E-1/38.823 (2007)
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undertakings in our dataset, 32 are immunity applicants and therefore no ￿ne was imposed
for their infringement (and therefore did not appeal the Commission decision). In one further
case the Commission withdrew its original ￿ne (for Bosch in the Navewa-Anseau case).23 Out
of the remaining 961 undertakings, 679 (approximately 70%) have appealed the Commission
decision while 282 have not. The ￿gure below provides information on the share of ￿rms
that has appealed a Commission ￿ning decision per year, excluding immunity applicants.
We observe that in several years all ￿ned undertakings have appealed Commission decisions
and furthermore a greater proportion of ￿rms have appealed Commission ￿nes post 1998.


































































































However, while the proportion of cases that is appealed is still very high in the last decade,
the percentage of undertakings that resort to European Courts following a ￿ning decision
has fallen since the introduction of the 2006 Guidelines. Excluding the undertakings for
which immunity was granted, approximately 62% of the undertakings ￿ned under the 2006
Guidelines have resorted to European Courts compared to almost 75% for the 1998 Guidelines
and 69% for the undertakings ￿ned before the introduction of the 1998 Guidelines.24
Reductions in Fines/Judicial review Firms ￿ned by the Commission for antitrust infringe-
ments can resort to European Courts. Before 1988 all such cases were dealt at the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ"). Following the creation of the European Court of First Instance
23Case IV/29.995 (1981)
24Note that these numbers are not discernible from the graph since a signi￿cant number of cases post
2006 was still decided under the 1998 Guidelines (since the Statement of Objections was dated before the
introduction of the 2006 Guidelines).
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("CFI") antitrust appeals were ￿rst dealt by the CFI and then undertakings can further
appeal at the ECJ.25
We examine the outcome of the ￿rst appeal of an undertaking at the European Courts.
For 129 undertakings the ￿rst appeal is still pending which includes all the cases adopted
following the 2006 Guidelines.
The average reduction in the ￿ne has been approximately 30% with around 27% of
undertakings (147 undertakings) having their ￿ne squashed by the European Courts, while
46% of the appeals were completely dismissed (i.e. no reduction in the ￿ne was granted
to 252 ￿rms). In one case, the ￿ne was even increased (for BASF for its participation in
the Choline Chloride cartel26 the ￿ne was increased by 0.15%). The ￿gure below shows the
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reduction
Following the introduction of the 1998 Guidelines, a lower number of appeals leads to
zero ￿ne (23% versus 29% before the 1998 Guidelines), while a constant share of the appeals
in both periods gain no reduction in ￿ne (approximately 46%). The average reduction in the
￿ne following the 1998 Guidelines is approximately 30% while in the cases adopted before
the Guidelines the average reduction in the ￿ne is 40%.
Interestingly, for undertakings ￿ned for their participation in cartels it is more likely that
there is a reduction in the ￿ne (60% receive some reduction in the ￿ne) while only 45% of
￿rms that allegedly infringed article 102 receive a reduction in the ￿ne and only 25% of the
addressees of an article 101 infringement decision (other than cartels) receive a reduction in
the ￿ne.
25The Polypropylene case (case IV/31.149 (1986)) which was adopted in 1986 was decided by the CFI.
26Case C/37.533 (2004)
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3.3.1.1 Case characteristics
Type of Antitrust infringement We further distinguish between di⁄erent antitrust infringe-
ments over time. We consider a general distinction between cartel cases27, other article 101
agreements (mostly preventing parallel import cases) and cases of abuse of dominant position
(article 102). A few cases have been treated by the Commission as both cartel and article
102 cases (the French-West African shipowners￿committees, European sugar industry, Trans
Atlantic Conference Agreement, Cewal and the 1988 Flat Glass case)28. Since these decisions
have both cartel and article 102 aspects we include them in the statistics as 0.5 cartel and
0.5 abuse of dominance (this concerns in total 43 undertakings).
Overall, 797 undertakings have been ￿ned due to their participation in cartels, 164 for
breaching article 101 (non cartel cases) and 76 for abuse of dominant position.
In terms of cases, there have been 106 cartel cases, 54 other article 101 cases and 36
article 102 cases. Interestingly, the vast majority of the ￿nes have been imposed on cartel
cases (almost 80%) while abuse of dominance cases represent 17% of the ￿nes, and other
article 101 cases a mere 3%.
Therefore it appears that cartel cases are ￿ned harsher. This may re￿ ect that in article
102 cases it is harder to establish that the ￿rms had intent for the anticompetitive practice;
however, some of the most severe ￿nes have been imposed for article 102 infringements.







27The great majority of cartel cases are under article 101. However, very few cases (notably the Reinforcing
bar cartel case) have been pursued under article 65 of the ESCS Treaty (Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community).
28Cases IV/32.450 (1992), IV/26.918 (1973), IV/35.134 (1998), IV/32.448 and IV/32.450 (1992), IV/31.906
(1988) respectively.
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Complexity of the case Two additional variables were used in the analysis that re￿ ect
the degree of complexity of the case. First, the number of recitals is used as an indicator
of the e⁄ort placed by the Commission in explaining its analysis of the infringement at
stake. Secondly, the duration of the proceedings from the Statement of Objections until the
adoption of the Commission decision should also re￿ ect the complexity of the case. A shorter
time span should re￿ ect a less complex case while a lengthy period should mirror di¢ culties
in drafting the decision and collecting the relevant evidence.
The public version of the decision was not available for a small number of cases and
therefore information on the recitals was not available for the Aluminium Fluoride cartel,29
the Chloroprene Rubber cartel,30 the Heat Stabilisers31 and the Concrete reinforcing bar
readoption case32 (all cases from 2007-9). The date of the Statement of Objections was not
available for the Aluminium Fluoride and the Concrete reinforcing bar readoption cartel
cases.
The shortest decision (in terms of recitals) is the Hudson￿ s Bay case33 which contains
16 recitals while the longest is the Intel case34 which contains 1803 recitals. Over time the
average recitals per case has increased substantially with more than 400 recitals in an average
decision during the last years. This is likely to be partly due to the fact that more cases over
time are cartel cases which typically include more recitals. On average, cartel cases have
approximately 320 recitals while article 102 cases 250 and other article 101 cases have much
fewer recitals (87).





































34Case COMP/C-3 /37.990 (2009)
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Also, the duration of the investigation has been varying signi￿cantly over time. In
the 1974 General Motors Continental case35 it took only 140 days since the Statement of
Objections for the decision to be adopted. On the other hand, the Soda ash readoption case
36 in 2000 was adopted 10 years after the ￿rst Statement of Objections.
Also as a result of this case, 2000 is the year in which it has taken on average the longest
to adopt a decision. However, since then we observe a reduction in the average duration of
the investigations.
In terms of the di⁄erent types of infringement, article 102 cases are typically the most
lengthy procedures with more than 700 days of investigation between the Statement of
Objections and the ￿nal decision. Cartel cases are also time consuming with approximately
670 days while other article 101 infringements take on average 500 days.

















































































































Guidelines 93 cases (in which 524 undertakings were involved) have been adopted before
the 1998 Guidelines while 81 cases (involving 378 undertakings) follow the 1998 Guidelines.
These are cases in which the Statement of Objections was sent after January 1998. Finally
17 cases, involving 92 undertakings, have been adopted following the 2006 Guidelines (cases
in which the Statement of Objections was sent after September 2006).
35Case IV/28.851 (1974)
36Case COMP/33.133-D (2000)
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We observe that cartel cases have been rapidly increasing as a proportion of ￿ning deci-
sions over time, constituting over 90% of the cases in the period following the 2006 Guidelines.
Article 102 cases have been relatively stable in the ￿rst two periods while only one article 102
case (the Intel case37 which however is the case with the highest ￿ne ever set by the Commis-
sion) has been adopted following the 2006 Guidelines. Other 101 cases have decreased very
signi￿cantly; while they represented 44% of cases before the 1998 Guidelines, there is not a
single decision taken in the last 3-4 years. This can be explained due to the initial (implicit)
objective of competition policy of prohibiting parallel import cases in order to promote a
closer economic area.














37Case COMP/C-3 /37.990 (2009)
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In terms of the size of ￿nes across the di⁄erent periods, a similar picture emerges -yet
the pattern is less pronounced. Cartels already represented around 75% of all the ￿nes even
before the 1998 Guidelines while this ratio increased slightly above 80% with the 1998 and
2006 Guidelines. Article 102 cases￿share oscillates between 15 and 20% while other article
101 infringements have always represented a very small ratio of the ￿nes imposed (in all
periods less than 5%).
Leniency program reductions Leniency applications have become a very important tool
for antitrust authorities in their ￿ght against cartels. In the EEA, there have been 32
immunity undertakings to which immunity from ￿nes has been granted. In one further
case38 a reduction of 90% was granted, while 50% and 30% reductions were granted to 25
and 24 undertakings respectively. Leniency (i.e. some reduction in the ￿ne) was granted
to 234 undertakings; 202 such undertakings were granted leniency in a decision where the
￿nes was calculated on the basis of the 1998 Guidelines while 31 undertakings were granted
leniency in a decision adopted following the 2006 Guidelines. Under the 2006 Guidelines,
there has been a relatively high number of undertakings granted immunity (9 undertakings).
Since 2001, the ￿rst year where an immunity application was granted (Brasserie de
Luxemburg in the PO/Interbrew and Alken-Maes case39), in every year there have been
undertakings granted immunity. The highest number of undertakings that were granted
immunity was in 2002 and 2006, namely 5.
In the decisions that were adopted following the 1998 Guidelines, 62% involved at least
one undertaking whose ￿ne was reduced due to the leniency program. This share increases
to 76% with the 2006 Guidelines.
38Case COMP/E-1/36 604 Citric acid
39Case IV/37.614/F3 (2001)
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In terms of the impact of leniency in reducing the duration of cartel proceedings, while
the average duration of cartels with no leniency granted is approximately 725 days, this
reduces to 587 for the cartels in which leniency reductions were granted. Furthermore, for
cases in which total immunity has been granted the average duration falls drastically to 391
days. This demonstrates the importance of the leniency program in providing information
that reduces the length of the proceedings and thereby saving resources for the Commission.
3.3.1.3 Firm characteristics
Listed ￿rms The greatest number of ￿nes has been imposed on ￿rms that are listed on
stock markets (or their parent company is listed). 53% of the ￿rms that have been ￿ned are
listed while in terms of the ￿nes￿ s value this ratio is much greater and over 90%.
However, one has to recognise that this variable does not perfectly capture the size of
the ￿rms since especially in the Southern countries there are family companies that should
fall into the category of "large ￿rms" given the accessibility to ￿nancial resources.
A problem that we faced in the analysis is that mergers and acquisitions as well as
bankruptcies are a common feature of the corporate structure. This constant restructuring
has complicated the data collection i.e. to track whether an undertaking was listed at the
time of the ￿ning decisions. The information gathering was based on information available
at the Commission decision and on the internet.
Nationality of the ￿rm Another ￿rm characteristic used in the analysis is the country
in which the ￿rms originate. In several cases the ￿rms that were ￿ned had headquarters in
several countries and/or the subsidiary which was ￿ned was not necessarily based in the same
country as the parent company. Therefore, in this paper we distinguish the undertakings
into those with no connection to the European Economic Area countries and those who
are either headquartered in the EEA or the subsidiary that was ￿ned was established in an
EEA country. We propose this distinction since in the EEA the European Commission has
extensive powers for investigation and the European Courts adjudicates for EEA law.40
81% of all the undertakings ￿ned are EEA ￿rms (or the subsidiary ￿ned was an EEA
undertaking) while the remaining are based primarily in the US, Japan and Switzerland.
Among the EEA ￿rms, German, Belgian, French, Dutch and UK undertakings are the most
often ￿ned.
40Note for example that a Swedish undertaking which was ￿ned before the Swedish accession the EU is
treated as a non-EEA undertaking.
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Another variable of interest is whether the law of the ￿rms￿country of origin is of common
or civil tradition. The great majority of the ￿rms have civil law tradition (83%) which re￿ ects
the law in the majority of EEA countries (with the exception of UK, Ireland and Cyprus).
3.3.2 Decision to appeal before the European Courts
In this section we investigate the determinants of the probability that a ￿rm that has
been ￿ned will resort to the European Courts. The main focus of the analysis is to control
for relevant variables in order to determine the relationship between the ￿ning Guidelines of
1998 and 2006 and the probability to appeal. Also political variables such as the nationality
of the undertaking and case related variables such as the type of the infringement and the
complexity of the case have interesting interpretations.
Even if each case is addressed to all the involved ￿rms in the anticompetitive behaviour,
the ￿nes are imposed on individual participants and some undertakings may appeal a decision
while other addressees of the same decision might chose not to appeal. Therefore, we consider
that it is more appropriate to take as the unit of observation each individual participant
rather than the case as a whole. We provide, however, information on both ￿rm and case
level.
3.3.2.1 The model
In the model the dependent variable, the decision of a ￿rm to appeal, may take only
two values i.e. it is a dummy variable representing the occurrence of an event taking value 1
when there is an appeal while 0 otherwise. The goal is to determine the relationship between




1 with probability p
0 with probability 1 ￿ p
)
A regression model is formed by parameterising the probability p to depend on a regressor
vector x and a parameter vector ￿: Speci￿cally we assume that the model takes conditional
probability given by
pi ￿ Pr[yi = 1jx] = F(x
0
i￿)
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where F() is a continuous strictly increasing function. The choice of the function F()
determines the type of binary model. The logit model arises if F() is the cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) of the logistic distribution (￿(x0￿) = ex0￿
1+ex0￿) and the probit model
arises if F() is the standard normal cdf (￿(x0￿) =
R x0￿
￿1 ￿(z)dz). We have employed both a
logit and a probit model - the most commonly used parameterisations of binary models and
both provide very similar results. For ease of exposition only the results of the probit model
are presented (since logit results are very similar).
In the analysis, we regress the binary dependent variable on the ￿ne imposed, on ￿rm
characteristics (listed ￿rm, nationality (EEA and common law country)), case characteristics
(recitals, duration, type of infringement) and competition policy developments (Guidelines,
leniency). Given the exponential growth of the (in￿ ation adjusted) ￿ne imposed and of the
recitals of Commission decisions over time we use the logarithm of these variables.41 Fur-
thermore, we cluster the observations for a given case. In such speci￿cation the standard
errors allow for intragroup correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the observations
be independent. That is, the observations are independent across clusters (cases) but not
necessarily within a cluster (case). We follow this approach since we expect that the error
terms for the ￿rms ￿ned for the same case are a⁄ected by the same case speci￿c characteris-
tics. Furthermore, several regressants are dummy variables; whether ￿rms are listed (default
being a non listed company), have their headquarters or subsidiary ￿ned in the EEA (non
EEA as default) and whether the company or subsidiary ￿ned have common law tradition
(civil law as default), and dummies for the type of infringement (cartel and article 102) and
Guidelines (Guidelines 1998 and Guidelines 2006). We introduce the leniency policy vari-
able as the percentage reduction in the ￿ne granted to an undertaking, and not as a dummy
variable, in order to exploit the variation across the reductions in the ￿nes granted .
We provide results both at a ￿rm and at a case level for the probit analysis. In the latter
case, the dependent variable takes the value 1 when at least one of the undertakings ￿ned
lodged an appeal while it is 0 when no undertaking appealed the Commission decision. Fur-
thermore, ￿rm characteristics can no longer be employed as explanatory variables; however,
we introduce the average party ￿ne as well as the number of ￿rms in the case. The leniency
variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when there is at least one undertaking to
which a reduction in the ￿ne has been granted and 0 otherwise.
The results of the regressions are similar in both the individual ￿rm and the case level.
The table below provides the marginal e⁄ects42 as well as the coe¢ cient of the probit re-
41However this does not a⁄ect in any way the results of the probit analysis.
42Marginal e⁄ects show the change in the probability for an in￿nitesimal change in each independent,
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gressions. All variables have the expected signs, however, several variables are statistically
insigni￿cant. At the ￿rm level, the ￿ne imposed is always highly signi￿cant and the higher
the ￿ne the higher the probability that the ￿rm(s) lodges an appeal (a doubling of the av-
erage ￿ne at the levels from its mean value leads to an increase of approximately 1% point
in the probability of appeal). An increased complexity of the case (both in terms of recitals
and of duration of the case) leads to higher probability of appeal. The duration of the case
is signi￿cant at the ￿rm level while recitals are signi￿cant at the case level. At the ￿rm
level, a case which takes 30 days longer to be adopted increases the probability of appeal
by approximately 0.5% points. Firm characteristics (nationality and listed) as well as the
type of the infringement are found to be insigni￿cant. The leniency coe¢ cient at the ￿rm
level denotes that the higher the leniency granted to an undertaking the less likely it is that
the undertaking appeals the Commission decision (a doubling of the leniency o⁄ered from
the mean value leads to a 3% point reduction in the probability of appeal). Finally, as can
be seen from the table, while the 1998 Guidelines￿ s coe¢ cient is insigni￿cant the coe¢ cient
for the 2006 Guidelines is positive and signi￿cant. The model predicts that there is a 28%
points lower probability that a ￿rm that has been ￿ned following the 2006 Guidelines (con-
trolling for all the variables in the regression) resorts to the European Courts (74% prior
to 2006 Guidelines and 45% following the 2006 Guidelines). This may imply that the 2006
Guidelines have provided greater transparency in the way ￿nes are set and therefore there
is lower incentive to appeal the Commission ￿ning decisions.43
At the case level, the average ￿ne, the number of ￿rms, the recitals and the 2006 Guide-
lines are signi￿cant. Note that the marginal e⁄ect coe¢ cients are larger since for the mean
observation the predicted probability that at least one ￿rm appeal is 0.82% (compared to
0.73% at the ￿rm level).
continuous variable and reports the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
43The coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 10% level; however, if one excludes from the probit analysis the
dummy variable on 1998 Guidelines the coe¢ cient is also signi￿cant at the 5% level.
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3.3.3 Success of Court appeals
In this section we run a multinomial model to assess how the outcome of the appeals is
determined by the explanatory variables, and especially the policy variables. Multinomial
models generalise bivariate analysis by allowing the discrete outcome (dependent) variable
to take more than two possible values. Di⁄erent multinomial models arise owing to di⁄erent
functional forms of the probabilities of the multinomial distribution, similar to the di⁄erences
between probit and logit models in the binary case. The most often used model is the
multinomial logit, which we also use in this section. We construct a new variable that
re￿ ects the extent of success of the appeals. This variable takes the value 0 when the
reduction granted by the Courts is smaller than 25% (319 observations); the value of 1 when
the reduction is between 25-75% (67 observations) and value of 2 when essentially the Court
has slashed (or even quashed) the Commission ￿ne (more than 75% reduction was granted to
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164 ￿rms). Note that the results are robust to di⁄erent de￿nitions of the dependent variable.
The results of the analysis are provided in the table below, which shows the multinomial
logit regression coe¢ cients as well as the odds ratio.44 Note that the coe¢ cients in this
analysis should be interpreted relative to the reference or base category group, which is
a small reduction in the ￿nes.45 The results of the multinomial logit analysis shows that
moderate reductions in the ￿ne are more likely than small reductions for higher ￿nes. On the
contrary, the coe¢ cient of the ￿ne variable for large reductions is insigni￿cant. Interestingly,
the only ￿rm characteristic that is signi￿cant is whether the ￿rm is EEA-related. Non EEA
￿rms are more likely to receive a signi￿cant reduction in their ￿ne than EEA undertakings
which indicates that the Commission loses more often against non EEA undertakings at
the European Courts on more serious grounds. This may indicate a political bias of the
Commission against non EEA undertakings. In terms of the leniency policy, undertaking
that have received higher reductions in the ￿ne through the leniency program are less likely
to be granted large reductions in their ￿ne than small reductions. Firms that have been
￿ned in the context of cartel and article 102 infringements are more likely to receive a large
reduction rather than a small reduction in the ￿ne. Finally, concerning the impact of the
Guidelines, we ￿rst note that it is not possible to assess the relationship between the success
of appeals of cases following the 2006 Guidelines, since no such appeal has been adjudicated
by the Courts yet. Following the 1998 Guidelines the probability that an appeal will lead to
moderate reductions in the ￿nes is lower compared to small reductions in the ￿nes. The e⁄ect
is signi￿cant with the the relative risk for moderate relative to small reduction in the ￿ne
expected to decrease by 85%, as shown by the odds ratio coe¢ cient (multiplied by a factor
of 0.15). Therefore, the analysis seems to partly con￿rm that following the 1998 Guidelines
the Commission is more rarely loosing appeals on substantive issues (Geradin and Henry
(2005)). After controlling for the e⁄ect of the leniency policy, it appears that the Guidelines
have been particularly e⁄ective in reducing the success of ￿rms￿appeals to achieve moderate
reductions in their ￿ne. This may be the original objective of the Guidelines since whether
the Commission loses on substantive issues (re￿ ected in cases where the Court reduces the
￿ne by more than 75%) should not in principle be the cases that would be addressed by the
￿ning Guidelines.
These results also square with the observation that ￿nes have increased exponentially over
time while the reductions granted by the Courts have been on average lower (approximately
44A standard interpretation of the relative risk ratio (also known as odds ratio) is as follows: for a unit
change in the predictor variable, the relative risk ratio of the outcome in question relative to the reference
group is expected to change by a factor of the respective parameter estimate.
45Only the sign of the estimated coe¢ cients of the multinomial logit regression can be interpreted.
Magos, Dimitrios (2011), Three Essays in Competition Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/259513.4. CONCLUSION 105
40% in cases before the 1998 Guidelines, falling to 30% in the period post Guidelines).
3.4 Conclusion
This article has reviewed all the Commission decisions imposing ￿nes to undertakings
for infringing antitrust rules and provides a statistical analysis of case, ￿rm and policy
characteristics. Antitrust ￿nes have exponentially increased over time as well as the length
at which the Commission analyses the case in its decision (re￿ ected by the recitals). The
Commission￿ s enforcement priority appears to be cartel detection while there have been fewer
and fewer other article 101 infringements (such as preventing parallel imports). Leniency
policy has been an important tool for the Commission in this ￿ght against cartels since
in a signi￿cant proportion of cartel cases the Commission has granted full immunity to
undertakings. These cartel cases also have much shorter duration periods, implying that
leniency policy does not only allow the Commission to track down cartels but also to conclude
more timely a case.
The main focus of the article, however, has been on the appeals placed by the under-
takings ￿ned in the context of an antitrust infringement. The appeal rate appears to be
constant or even increase over time. However, when controlling for all the relevant variables,
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the analysis demonstrates that especially following the 2006 Guidelines, it is less likely that
￿rms appeal the Commission decision. One interpretation of this ￿nding is that the Guide-
lines have helped improve the transparency in the ￿ne setting thereby reducing the incentive
of ￿rms to resort to European Courts. The probability of appeal is also very signi￿cantly
in￿ uenced by the level of the ￿ne imposed and by whether the ￿rm under question has been
granted leniency.
In terms of the success of the appeals, following the introduction of the 1998 Guidelines,
moderate reductions in the ￿nes have been less likely than small reductions. Also, higher
leniency granted to an undertaking leads to a lower probability that the Courts would grant
a signi￿cant reduction in the ￿ne, and non EEA ￿rms are more likely to receive a singi￿cant
reduction in their ￿ne by the European Courts.
There are several limitations of the analysis. A main problem relates to possibly omitted
variables which might alter some of the results. However, the analysis shows that even when
some variables are dropped the signs of the remaining coe¢ cients are robust. Furthermore,
the empirical analysis presented here does not establish a causal link between the dependent
and independent variables which would require a background theoretical model. This is an
interesting area for future research on the basis of papers by Waldfogel (1995) and Priest
and Klein (1984) which study the incentives of ￿rms to appeal.
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